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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Nanotechnologies are enabling, dual-use technologies with the potential to alter the modern world 
significantly, from fields as wide-ranging as warfare to industrial design to medicine to social and 
human engineering. Seizing the technological lead in nanotech is often viewed as an imperative for 
both 21st century defense and global competitiveness. Only revolutionary technologies are believed 
to allow a country to take advantage of its relative backwardness—in the sense of its lack of 
commitment to existing, incremental technologies—and leap ahead of existing technological leaders 
in developing and deploying a revolutionary new technology. New technologies, however, are only 
likely truly to revolutionize an economy and society if there is a broader national base that allows a 
new technology to spread and transform from its initial niche application, whether civilian or 
military, and if society is willing to adopt the technology in question. Globally, there is significant 
belief in the revolutionary potential of nanotechnology, not only to transform warfare, economy and 
society, but also the international geopolitical hierarchy. Between 2001 and 2014, over sixty countries 
followed the United States and established nanotechnology initiatives. These countries range from 
advanced industrial countries in Europe to Japan to the emerging markets of Russia, China, Brazil, 
and India to developing countries such as Nepal and Pakistan.  
In order to understand the risks associated with nanotechnology with respect to U.S. national 
security and leadership and means for managing them, the report begins with an examination of 
some of nanotech’s military applications, and interdisciplinary nature of nanotechnology. 
Definitional and data challenges make risk assessments of nanotech’s security, market, safety, health 
and environmental impacts difficult. This difficulty is reflected in the lack of multilateral and 
national efforts to govern nanotechnologies for security purposes. The report then sketches the 
global landscape of national nanotechnology efforts, with brief looks at Brazil, India and Russia, the 
European Union, Germany, and the United Kingdom and a portrait of China. In order to 
understand nanotechnology’s potential for technological surprise and disruption of the geopolitical 
position of the United States, it examines these empirical results against the background of the 
factors shaping government control of technological superiority. The report then concludes with an 
initial assessment of whether nanotechnology is revolutionary, and presents its key findings and 
policy recommendations. The findings presented here should be considered as preliminary, in that 
the report highlights central definitional and data challenges. Such conditions are ripe for overselling 
or underestimating nanotechnology’s potential and prevent the provision of more definitive answers. 
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KEY  FINDINGS  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS  
v Nanotechnology is a general-purpose technology that is contributing to the ongoing revolution in 
information and communications technologies, microelectronics and robotics.  
v Nanotechnology is unlikely to provide the basis for novel weapons of mass destruction or mass 
effect. Such applications, though notional, would be most likely in the chemical and biological 
spheres. 
v Nanotechnology, if widely adopted, is likely to dramatically improve the health and resilience of 
armed forces personnel and the public and potentially even reduce resource scarcity as a cause of 
war. Widespread adoption is uncertain, however, as considerable concern exists over 
environmental, health, and safety risks. 
v Governance specific to dual-use and military applications of nanotechnology at the multilateral or 
national levels is generally absent. In its stead, there is increasing devolution of responsibility for 
national security to corporations and individual scientists. 1  U.S. agencies should work 
internationally to generate new multilateral norms and rules governing nanotech development 
and use, as well as with academics and corporations to foster a culture of nano-security and dual-
use awareness and codes of conduct for research and development. 
v Awareness of nanotechnology advances is hindered by the questionable comparability and quality 
of existing indicators on nanotechnology research and development. Rigorous data collection is 
needed on nanotechnology’s military and commercial applications and health, safety, and 
environmental impacts and to support interdisciplinary collaboration between scientists, 
policymakers, defense practitioners, and market actors to facilitate comparative longitudinal, 
cross-national and global supply-chain data collection and measurement. 
v Based on available data, the United States remains the leader in nanotechnology. Other Asian 
countries, including China, are expanding and improving their nanotechnological base. In order 
to maintain its position, the USG should continue its investment in nanotechnology, with an 
ongoing and sustained commitment to basic R&D and increased assistance in the 
commercialization of nanotech applications.   
                                                
1 Margaret E. Kosal, “Strategy, Technology, and Governance: Shift of Responsibility from Nation-
states to Individuals,” Presentation prepared for delivery at the Society for the Study of Nanoscience 
and Emerging Technologies 5th Annual Meeting, Boston, MA, October 27-29, 2013 
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I.  INTRODUCTION: THE GLOBAL PURSUIT OF NANOTECHNOLOGY  
Often hailed as the next “technological revolution,” nanotechnology is being pursued by countries 
aspiring to enhanced wealth and influence in world politics. Nanotechnologies are enabling 
technologies with the potential to significantly alter the modern world, from fields as far flung as 
warfare to industrial design to medicine to social and human engineering. Nanotech is not merely 
about size, it is about the unique physical, chemical, biological and optical properties that emerge 
naturally at the nanoscale and the ability to manipulate and engineer such effects. It is a broad new 
area of science, involving physics, chemistry, biology, materials science, and engineering at the 
nanoscale. 
Seizing the technological lead in nanotech is often viewed as an imperative for global economic 
competitiveness and 21st century defense. Technological change offers both hope and concern over 
national prosperity and security. It raises the prospects of tremendous increases in wealth, 
productivity, and quality and length of life. Technological change, however, can disrupt entire 
national and global industries and dramatically shift the relative wealth of nations—if the technology 
in question is truly revolutionary. Technological change can restructure warfare and defense, 
empower non-state actors as well as states, and wreak destruction on human life and the 
environment.  
Nanotechnology has captured the imagination of national governments as the foundation for a 
technological revolution. Nanotechnology’s potential for disruption led former Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense Clifford Lau to herald it as leading to a new revolution in military affairs, one 
more important than the invention of gunpowder. 2  A former U.S. official stated that 
nanotechnologies “have even greater potential than nuclear weapons to radically change the balance 
of power” and will alter warfare more than the invention of gunpowder.3 Russian President Vladimir 
Putin stressed that Russia needs an “innovation army” using nanotechnology to keep up in a new 
                                                
2 Barnaby J. Feder, "Frontier of Military Technology is in the Size of a Molecule," New York Times, 
April 10, 2003 
3  David Jeremiah, “Nanotechnology and Global Security.” (Palo Alto, CA; Fourth Foresight 
Conference on Molecular Nanotechnology), November 9, 1995; Clifford Lau, Deputy 
Undersecretary of Defense for Basic Research, cited in (Feder 2003) 
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high tech arms race.4 Some of the most worrisome aspects of nanotechnology are the potentials for 
new biological, chemical, or nanomaterial weapons and delivery mechanisms.5  
Governments have incorporated nanotechnologies and emerging technologies as part of their 
“smart goals” for competitiveness and are investing considerable funds in them. U.S. politicians 
have argued that, “U.S. economic competitiveness in the global marketplace depends on success in 
developing a vibrant and innovative nanotechnology community.”6 In 2005, the United Nations 
Task Force on the Millennium Development Goals touted nanotech as one of three platform 
technologies that can reduce hunger, promote health, improve water sanitation, develop renewable 
resources and improve the environment, and recommended that developing countries create 
nanotech programs.7  Inspired by such forecasts, between 2001 and 2014, over sixty countries 
followed the United States and established nanotechnology initiatives. These countries range from 
advanced industrial countries in Europe and Japan to the emerging markets of Russia, China, Brazil, 
and India. More recently, Malaysia and Singapore have established national nanotechnology 
initiative, and some of the latest ones have appeared in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Pakistan.8  
                                                
4 Vladimir Putin, quoted in “Putin Warns of New Worldwide Arms Race,” www.chinaview.cn 
February 8, 2008.  
5 Margaret E. Kosal, Nanotechnology for chemical and biological defense. (New York: Springer, 2009).  
6 George Allen, “The Economic Promise of Nanotechnology,” Issues in Science & Technology  (Summer 
2005). Online: http://issues.org/21-4/allen/. 
7 Juma, Calestous, Lee Yee-Cheong, Technology and Innovation Un Millennium Project. Task Force 
on Science, and Programme United Nations Development, Innovation : applying knowledge in 
development, Edited by Calestous Juma, Lee Yee-Cheong, Technology and Innovation Un Millennium 
Project, Task Force on Science and Programme United Nations Development, Applying knowledge in 
development. London ; Sterling, Va.: London ; Sterling, Va.: Earthscan (2005); Salamanca-Buentello, 
Fabio, Deepa L. Persad, Erin B. Court, Douglas K. Martin, Abdallah S. Daar, and Peter A. Singer, 
"Nanotechnology and the Developing World (Policy Forum)."  PLoS Medicine 2 (5), 2005; P. Singer., 
F. Salamanca-Buentello, and A. Daar, "Harnessing Nanotechnology to improve global equity: the 
less industrialized countries are eager to play an early role in developing this technology; the global 
community should help them."  Issues in Science and Technology 21 (4), 2005. 
8 Mihail Roco, Nanotechnology research directions for societal needs in 2020 retrospective and outlook. Edited by 
Chad A. Mirkin, Mark C. Hersam and SpringerLink (United States] : Dordrecht ; New York: United 
States : World Technology Evaluation Center ; Dordrecht ; New York : Springer, 2011a); Donald 
Maclurcan, "Nanotechnology and Developing Countries - Part 2: What Realities?"  AzONano-Online 
Journal of Nanotechnology 1 (2005); ETC Group, "Geopiracy: The Case Against Geoengineering" 
(2010); X. Li et al., "Worldwide Nanotechnology Development: A Comparative Study of USPTO, 
EPO, and JPO Patents (1976–2004)."  Journal of Nanoparticle Research 9:977–1002 (2007) 
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Billions of dollars have been put towards nanotech.9 In 2011, Lux Research estimated that total 
global funding for nanotechnology (public and private) in 2010 was $17.8 billion dollars, of which 
corporate R&D funding was $9.6 billion. Governments invested about $10 billion in nanotech in 
2011, with an expected growth rate of 20% in annual government funding over 2012-15.10 The U.S. 
government alone has provided almost $20 billion in nanotechnology funding over the 2001-14 
period.11 Chinese government support for nanotechnology is estimated to have grown at a rate of 
30-45% a year since 2004.12 Through 2010, global government expenditures in nanotechnology were 
estimated to have reached $67.5 billion.13 Cumulative corporate and private funding through 2015 
for nanotech R&D is estimated to amount to an additional $150 billion.14  
 In this age of globalization, almost all advanced technology may be deemed dual-use, as countries 
pursue both spin-on (military) and spin-off (civilian) strategies of technological innovation. 
Governments face tradeoffs between security and the need for government control, and economic 
competitiveness and the openness necessary for innovation. Whether national military and economic 
advantage can be manufactured and maintained in a world of global corporate (R&D) and 
production alliances is, however, a subject of debate. If nations can create and maintain the 
technological lead in revolutionary emerging technologies, the assumption is that their military and 
economic competitiveness will overtake and supplant contemporary military and industrial leaders, 
including the United States. 
                                                
9 John F. Sargent, Jr., Nanotechnology: a policy primer. (Congressional Research Service Report, 
2013). 
10  John F. Sargent, Jr., "Nanotechnology: a policy primer. (Congressional Research Service Report 
2010); Cíentifica, "Half Way to the Trillion Dollar Market? A Critical Review of the Diffusion of 
Nanotechnologies, Market Report. Research Policy" (2013);Cientifica, “Global Funding of 
Nanotechnologies and Its Impact” (2011).  
11 NNI, "Frequently Asked Questions." U.S. National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), 2014. 
12 Anne L. Clunan, personal communication with senior member of the U.S. Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP) Nanoscale Science, Engineering, and Technology (NSET) Subcommittee 
and the National Nanotechnology Coordination Office (NNCO), Washington, DC, May 30, 2013. 
13 John F. Sargent, Jr., "Nanotechnology: a policy primer.(Congressional Research Service Report 
2010); Cientifica, “Global Funding of Nanotechnologies and Its Impact” (2011).  
14 Cientifica, “Global Funding of Nanotechnologies and Its Impact” (2011). 
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THIS  REPORT  
There is at present great uncertainty about whether nanotech is truly revolutionary or will merely 
produce incremental improvements in military and civilian applications. There is a need to take stock 
of current national efforts in the nanotechnology field and the literatures on technological 
revolutions and technological innovation to provide a framework for a preliminary assessment of 
nanotech’s revolutionary potential, risks, and management. This report provides the results of such 
an exercise to investigate nanotechnology’s potential to disrupt economic paradigms and 
revolutionize countries’ economic and political-military positions internationally. The report 
represents the first year of work in a broader multi-year research effort. That broader effort will 
undertake a comprehensive cross-national analysis of: the threats to and opportunities for U.S. 
national security and economic prosperity from commercial and military nanotechnology; divergent 
national nanotechnology developmental strategies; and nanotechnology governance structures 
emerging in and across critical countries. This report takes stock of current national efforts in the 
nanotechnology field and the literatures on technological revolutions and technological innovation 
to assess nanotechnology’s potential to disrupt military and economic paradigms and revolutionize 
countries’ economic and political-military positions internationally. It assesses the challenges and 
opportunities in the risk assessment and management of emerging and dual-use nanotechnologies 
and the potential for technological surprise arising from their application. The report is organized 
around four central questions:  
What is nanotechnology? 
What is the state of nanotechnology governance? 
What is the global nanotechnology research and development (R&D) landscape? 
Will a nanotechnology revolution surprise us? 
The findings presented here should be considered as only preliminary in that the report highlights 
central questions related to evaluating nanotech, without providing any definitive answers, as these 
require further research. In part, this tentativeness reflects the uncertainty surrounding investigations 
into any emerging technology; more specifically, it stems from the current lack of a consensual basis 
for defining and measuring what nanotechnology is and, therefore, the significant difficulty in 
evaluating existing data that are often non-comparable and of questionable quality. Such conditions 
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are ripe for overselling or underestimating nanotechnology’s potential; the report attempts a clear-
eyed assessment based on publicly available data and the evaluations of scholars and policy 
practitioners.  
The challenges and requirements of assessing nanotechnologies is the subject of section II. The 
question, “what is nanotechnology?” does not have a simple answer. Here the focus is on the 
military applications of nanotech, and definitional and measurement problems that make it difficult 
to establish regulatory definitions and standards governing nano-enabled technologies. Section III, 
on governance, surveys the multilateral, national, and commercial regimes for dual-use technology, 
and finds that there is little effort to create new, nanotech-specific technology controls or 
multilateral governance mechanisms.  Section IV provides a global overview of national efforts in 
nanotechnology and the rapid diffusion of national nanotechnology initiatives, with a quick look at 
Brazil, India, and Russia, snapshots of the European, German, and British approaches, and an in-
depth portrait of China’s approach to regulating strategic economic sectors and efforts in 
nanotechnology development. Section V turns to the contemporary conditions shaping national 
efforts to move to the forefront of technological innovation. It considers whether nanotechnology is 
likely to allow technological laggards to displace the United States economically and politically. The 
final section examines the expected consequences of disruptive and revolutionary technologies to 
address the question of technological surprise. It provides a preliminary assessment of whether the 
hype and hope about nanotechnologies’ revolutionary potential is warranted. The report concludes 
with policy recommendations and suggestions for areas for further research.  
II.  WHAT IS NANOTECHNOLOGY 
According to the U.S. National Nanotechnology Initiative, “nanotechnology is the understanding 
and control of matter at the nano-scale, at dimensions between approximately 1 and 100 
nanometers, where unique phenomena enable novel applications. Encompassing nanoscale science, 
engineering, and technology, nanotechnology involves imaging, measuring, modeling, and 
manipulating matter at this length scale.”15 One nanometer is a billionth of a meter, or 10-9 of a 
meter (for a sense of scale, the size ratio between a nanometer and a meter is roughly that of a 
marble to the planet Earth). Physicist Richard Feynman, in a famous 1959 speech that foretold the 
                                                
15 “What it is and how it works,” National Nanotechnology Initiative, May 20, 2012. 
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development of nanoscience, spoke of “plenty of room at the bottom.”16 It was not, however, until 
the late 1980s that scientists developed some of the tools and materials necessary to explore the 
manipulation of matter at the atomic and nano scale.  
Nanotech is not merely about size, it is about the unique physical, chemical, biological and optical 
properties that emerge naturally at the nanoscale and the ability to manipulate and engineer such 
effects. It is a broad new area of science, involving physics, chemistry, biology, cognitive science, 
materials science, and engineering at the nanoscale. “Notable recent developments include 
organically growing nanoenabled solar cells in the form of wallpaper or as paint; silicon 
nanoparticles covered with a layer of gold and used in combination with infrared light to destroy 
cancerous tumors; silicon coated nanowires that form a highly efficient paper-like “sponge” to 
separate oil from water after, for instance, an oil spill; and nano-products that help to purify, 
desalinate and disinfect water, or store energy more efficiently.”17 
A central hurdle in attempting to evaluate nanotech’s potential impact on national security and 
competitiveness is that there is neither a consensual definition of what constitutes nanotechnology 
or even the nanoscale, nor, as a result, comparable and reliable data and metrics for measuring it. 
This section first discusses some of the dual-use applications of nanotechnology and the governance 
challenges they pose, and then reviews the definitional and measurement issues hindering accurate 
assessments of nanotechnology. 
AN  ENABLING,  DUAL-­‐‑USE  TECHNOLOGY  
Nanotechnology may represent the ultimate dual-use enabling technology, as it is devoted to 
nanoscale device construction and manipulation across any number of biological, chemical and 
physical platforms. Currently, there are over 1,600 commercial products relying on nanotech. 
Nanotech is today used in synthetic biology, defense applications, electronics, medicine, agriculture 
and food production, industrial and textile manufacturing, cosmetics, mountain bikes, cars and other 
consumer products, and environmental remediation.18 Nanotechnology, like biotechnology, faces a 
                                                
16 R.P. Feynman, "There's plenty of room at the bottom (data storage)." Journal of Microelectromechanical 
Systems 1 (1):60–66, 1992. 
17 Robert Falkner and Nico Jaspers, “Regulating Nanotechnologies: Risk, Uncertainty and the Global 
Governance Gap.” Global Environmental Politics (2012), p. 35. 
18 The Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies, "Inventories," (2012).  
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“dual-use dilemma,” in that the facilities, material, and knowledge used for peaceful purposes in 
research and development for chemicals, medicines, sensors, textiles, and other materials can be 
used for military and weapons purposes.19  
There is considerable ongoing research and development into military applications of 
nanotechnology. Some of these applications include: 
Nano-electronics. Nanotechnology combines with information and communications 
technology (ICT) to yields smaller, lighter, faster, and much more energy-efficient and easily 
deployable devices that enable real-time situational and information dominance that 
integrates the battlefield and strategic command. Nano-electronics are substantially 
enhancing everything from information operations (IO), data processing and flow, precision 
guidance of munitions, manned and unmanned vehicles, to individual human cognition and 
motor control.20 
Nano-coatings.  Applications of nano-coatings are used to stabilize highly explosive materials, 
making it much safer to handle nuclear and other warheads. Nano-coatings can also stabilize 
biological and chemical agents, making them longer lasting and diversifying their means of 
delivery. Radio-frequency shield coatings could provide privacy and security to shield 
buildings and wireless networks from radio waves.21 
Nano-optics. Nano-engineered negative index metamaterials are moving stealth technology 
toward cloaking and invisibility, based on their ability to deflect light away from around an 
object rather than reflect it. Optical fibers married with nanowires portend the advent of 
solar-rechargeable, portable and wearable electronic devices.22 
                                                
19 Ronald M. Atlas and Malcolm Dando, "The dual-use dilemma for the life sciences: perspectives, 
conundrums, and global solutions," Biosecurity and bioterrorism : biodefense strategy, practice, and science 4 
(3):276, 2006. 
20 Margaret E. Kosal, “Nanotechnology Threat Anticipation,” unpublished presentation, September 
3, 2012. 
21 S. S. Azim, et al, "Studies on Graphite Based Conductive Paint Coatings," Progress in Organic 
Coatings 55(1): 1-4, 2006. 
22 B. Weintraub, Y. G. Wei, and Z. L. Wang, "Optical Fiber/Nanowire Hybrid Structures for 
Efficient Three-Dimensional Dye-Sensitized Solar Cells,” Angewandte Chemie-International Edition 
48(47): 8981-8985, 2009. 
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Nano-sensors and nano-monitors. Quantum dots allow for tagging any object and monitoring its 
location and use. U.S. researchers have developed a chemical weapons sensor chip that is 
powered by a smart phone; others are developing chemical weapons sensors based on the 
chemical-sensing capability of nanoparticles in the wings of Morpho butterflies. Similar 
detectors for improvised explosive devices are in development.23 These tools will greatly 
enhance the detection of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive 
(CNBRNE) materials. For example, “As part of a fielded sensor or diagnostic system, a 
nanoenabled bio-IO weapon could exploit indigenous agricultural or bacterial systems as a 
means for surveillance, making use of plant, insect, or animal sentinels as part of a larger 
sensor network. The sensor network may also include nanoenabled motes or advanced 
nanosatellites and leverage handheld personal devices such as cell phones, iPods, or 
PDAs.”24 These tools may also be reversed to serve as activators of such devices as well. 
Nano-textiles. A tremendous amount of R&D is being devoted to develop nano-textiles that 
improve the performance and health of the individual soldier. Nanofabrics are being 
developed to enhance soldier armor and uniforms so as to reduce weight, provide ballistic 
protection, temperature modulation, trap germs, deliver real-time diagnosis and treatment of 
soldier health and detect exposure to electro-magnetic, radiological, biological and chemical 
weapons in situ. These textiles would be self-diagnosing and self-preparing. China, among 
others, has indigenously developed and deployed a nano-enabled space suit. The United 
States has invested $50 million in the Institute for Soldier Technologies at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology.  
Nano-unmanned devices. Nanorobots, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, offset and allow for 
manpower reductions, and enhance surveillance and allow for control of nuclear weapons 
and CBRNE. The Defense Advanced Projects Agency (DARPA) has demonstrated a nano-
                                                
23 Angela Jones, Jeanne Nye and Andrew Greenberg, “Nanotechnology in the Military: National 
Defense, Homeland Security,” Presentation prepared as part of the Small Science, Big Decisions project, 
University of Wisconsin, Madison Institute for Chemical Education, March 2011.  
24 Margaret E. Kosal, Nanotechnology for chemical and biological defense. (New York: Springer, 2009), 
pp. 95-96. 
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hummingbird capable of infiltrating buildings for indoor as well as outdoor surveillance.25 
The United Kingdom introduced a tiny nano-helicopter for reconnaissance patrol in 
Afghanistan. Microsatellites are made possible through nanotechnology. 26  Increased 
miniaturization will enable virtually invisible nano-motes to provide real-time monitoring. 
Nano-weapons. Nanotechnology is being studied for its impact on energetics and in the life 
and medical sciences for new media for delivering therapeutic agents; the U.S. and Indian 
militaries are researching nanotech for defense against chemical and biological warfare. 
Nano-engineered explosives increase destructive force with a decrease in weight, allowing 
for lighter, more energetic payloads that may rival nuclear weapons for weight-to-energetic 
force ratios. The Russian government in 2007 exploded what it claimed was a 
nanotechnology-enabled thermobaric air-fuel bomb, although it is disputed whether this 
“father of all bombs” contained novel nanotechnologies or relied on well-known naturally 
occurring energetic properties of metals.27 
The most likely offensive application of nanotechnology in the chemical and biological 
realm, according to a recent study, arises from combining nano-engineered structures and 
materials with biological agents to create novel nano-enabled biochemical weapons, 
potentially ones that are not affected by existing countermeasures. “Nanotechnology’s 
primary role in transforming today’s benign research advances into the future [biological] 
threats envisioned may be in providing structures at the molecular level that aid in the 
dissemination and stabilization of novel agents and the design of those agents to achieve the 
desired negative outcome…. A nanomaterial … may enhance the stability of a threat agent 
to facilitate weaponization, improve delivery efficacy, or modify the pathway of infection.”28 
                                                
25 DARPA, “Time Magazine Recognizes Darpa’s Hummingbird Nano Air Vehicle,” November 24 
2011. http://www.darpa.mil/NewsEvents/Releases/2011/11/24.aspx 
26  Giulio Monzoni, “Micro and Nanotechnology Applications for Space Micropropulsion” in 
Nitaigour Premchand Mahalik, ed., Micromanufacturing and Nanotechnology (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 
pp. 197-218. 
27 BBC News, “Russia Tests Giant Fuel-Air Bomb,” September 12, 2007.; F. Westerlund, Russian 
Nanotechnology R&D: Thinking Big about Small Scale Science, (Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research 
Agency, 2011); p. 33. 
28 Margaret E. Kosal, Nanotechnology for chemical and biological defense. (New York: Springer, 2009), p. 90. 
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Additionally, nano-enabled weapons may be developed that allow for disruption of the 
immune system, effectively defeating countermeasures and potentially creating new agents.29  
Another potential nano-weapon would be the deployment of toxic nanoparticles in means 
similar to biological or radiological weapons. Currently, the toxicity of nanoparticles is the 
subject of intense research and debate. Current production of common nanomaterials, such 
as nanosilver and carbon nanotubes, is still quite limited, in the range of hundreds to 
thousands of tons, while production of nano-titanium dioxide (widely used in cosmetics and 
paint) is in the millions of tons.30 Large-scale commercial production of nanoparticles is 
expected to increase rapidly over the next fifteen years. Should results confirm the toxicity of 
such nanoparticles, future ease of access and low cost may make them attractive as 
“conventional” weapons of mass destruction or effect.31 
The specter of automated molecular manufacturing based on self-replicating systems and artificial 
intelligence has led some to forecast a dismal future. Nanotechnology, in this view, will lead to a new 
global and extraordinarily expensive arms race for technological dominance, a dramatic increase in 
military instability, and reduced threshold for war. It will also augur the collapse of international 
trade, as nanotechnology allows the local production of goods once requiring foreign components.32  
DEFINING  NANOTECHNOLOGY:  NO  CONSENSUS  
A key challenge in efforts to assess nanotechnology’s potential and current use is definitional. One 
of the most popular definitions of nanotechnology is that of small size—in that one nanometer is a 
billionth of a meter. Of the competing definitions of nanotechnology, many mainly focus on size. 
Most accept that the term “nanoscale” is defined as a size range from approximately 1 nm to 100 
                                                
29 Margaret E. Kosal, Nanotechnology for chemical and biological defense. (New York: Springer, 2009), pp. 
96-97. 
30 Tobias Sonderer, Risk Assessment of Engineered Nanoparticles Based on Probabilistic Material Flow 
Analysis, Master’s Thesis (Zurich: Eidegenössische Technische Hochschule, 2009), p. 7. 
31 Margaret E. Kosal, Nanotechnology for chemical and biological defense. (New York: Springer, 2009), pp. 
93-95. 
32 Jürgen Altmann and Mark Gubrud, "Anticipating military nanotechnology."  IEEE Technology and 
Society Magazine 23 (4):33-40, 2004. 
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nm, though a scientifically based range goes from the atomic scale (0.2 nm) to 100 nm.33 The focus 
on the 1-100 nm range relates both to the convenience of some standard definition that can be used 
to categorize nanotech, nanoscience and nanoproducts, as well as to the quantum mechanical and 
other effects (especially those related to surface area) that are observed at this scale. The closer a 
material is to the 1 nm end of the range, the more quantum, as opposed to classical, mechanical 
effects are observed, while closer to the 100 nm end, classical effects are more present. 
In addition to the imprecision as to what nanotechnology is, it is also unclear how to define what it 
does, or even its effects. There currently does not exist any consensual statistical definition of 
nanotechnology, which makes assessment of military and commercial potential, actual market value, 
and risks to environment, health and safety difficult. The lack of definition also significantly 
complicates efforts to regulate the use and production of nanotechnology, as discussed below in the 
section on governance of nanotechnology. There continues to be considerable debate on what a 
statistical definition should be, bounded largely by two concerns: 1) the term should meaningfully 
connect a set of activities that have more in common than mere size, given the extraordinarily broad 
and diverse set of scientific and engineering disciplines operating at this scale; and 2) the definition 
should not be so limiting as to exclude future and emerging technologies that relate to the novel 
effects possible at the nanoscale.34  
Why  Definitions  Matter  
Size itself does not necessarily matter from a security, commercial, risk or regulatory point of view, 
as it is the nature and manipulation of nanoscale materials themselves that produce the novel 
properties and effects of interest.35 A definition based purely on size does not distinguish between 
naturally occurring versus engineered nanoscale effects. For example, gold and silver particles at the 
nanoscale naturally exhibit fundamentally different properties than at the macroscale. At the 
macroscale, gold is an inert, nonmagnetic yellow metal.  Gold at the nanoscale has quantum 
                                                
33 SCENIHR, “3.2. Definitions and Scope: The Appropriateness of Existing Methodologies to 
Assess the Potential Risks Associated with Engineered and Adventitious Products of 
Nanotechnologies,” 2006. 
34 George Khushf, "The Ethics of Nanotechnology. Vision and Values for a New Generation of 
Science and Engineering," Emerging Technologies and Ethical Issues in Engineering: Papers from a Workshop, 
October 14-15, 2003, pp. 29-56, National Academy of Engineering, editor. The National Academies 
Press, 2004; pp. 33-36. 
35 Nanowerk, "Definition of the Term Nanotechnology," 2013. 
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properties that make it catalytic, insulating, and magnetic. At different sizes and after absorbing 
different wavelengths of light, gold nanoparticles can look red, purple, black or green, a property 
discovered at least as early as ancient Roman times.36 Engineered gold nanoparticles are used in 
nanoelectromechanical systems, bioengineering, electronic textiles, nonlinear optics, among other 
applications.37 Silver is a widely used metal in nanotech applications. Silver nanoparticles exhibit 
antimicrobial (antibacterial and antiviral) properties, and have engineered into nanofibres used in 
clothing and medical supplies, such as wound dressings.38 Both gold and silver nanoparticles are 
useful in medical applications such as bioluminescence, biological sensors, labels, and therapeutics, 
and in electronics applications for insulating against and conducting electrical charges.39 Similarly, 
carbon nanofibers have long been understood to be extremely strong and light, but very difficult to  
bond to other materials. When U.S. corporation Zyvex Technologies developed a means to suspend 
carbon nanotubes (CNT) in a resin (trademarked Kentara), they broke this developmental barrier; 
commercial applications of their technology include carbon-nanotube-enhanced mountain bikes, 
baseball bats, and automobiles.40 Nanotechnology is widely used in semiconductor manufacturing, 
and owing to its surface area properties, has enabled much more massive computing power to come 
from billions of tinier and tinier transistors while reducing energy leakage. So while, size is a key 
aspect, nanotechnology is best thought of as an enabling technology, in that the manipulation of 
materials at the nanoscale is what produces new properties, whether in biology, chemistry, physics, 
electrical engineering, and any number of other disciplines. 
                                                
36 Rosamund Daw, “Nanotechnology is Ancient History,” The Guardian, April 24, 2012. 
http://www.theguardian.com/nanotechnology-world/nanotechnology-is-ancient-history  
37 Kenneth Chang, "Tiny is Beautiful: Translating ‘Nano’ into Potential." The New York Times, 
February 22, 2005; Siegel et al., "Properties of gold nanostructures sputtered on glass," Nanoscale 
Research Letters (2011); Janice L. Speshock et al., "Silver and Gold Nanoparticles Alter Cathepsin 
Activity In vitro,"  Nanotscale Research Letters 6 (17) (2011) 
38 Yasutaka Mori et al., "Antiviral activity of silver nanoparticle/chitosan composites against H1N1 
influenza A virus,"  Nanoscale Research Letters 8 (93) (2013); Sirajo Umar et ally potent silver-
organoalkoxysilane antimicrobial porous nanomembrane,"  Nanoscale Research Letters 8 (164) (2013); 
Janice L. Speshock et al., "Silver and Gold Nanoparticles Alter Cathepsin Activity In vitro,"  
Nanotscale Research Letters 6 (17) (2011) 
39 Yu Tao, Yuxiao Tao, Biaobing Wang, Liuyang Wang, and Yanlong Tai, "A facile approach to a 
silver conductive ink with high performance for macroelectronics," Nanoscale Research Letters 8 (296), 
2013. 
40 Margaret E. Kosal, “Nanotechnology Threat Anticipation,” unpublished presentation, September 
3, 2012; p. 16.  
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The European Union has targeted size as the decisive factor in defining a nanomaterial. According 
to the European Commission’s Recommendation 2011/ 6962 on the Definition of Nanomaterial, a 
‘nanomaterial’ covers natural, incidental, or manufactured material containing particles in an 
unbound state or as an aggregate or as an agglomerate, and where fifty percent or more of the 
particles in the number size distribution have one or more external dimensions in the range of 1 
nm–100nm. This fifty percent criterion is waived when warranted by environmental, health, safety 
or competitiveness concerns. The EU definition also includes a surface area by volume 
measurement of 60m2/cm3 as fitting the definition of nanomaterial. In addition, certain materials, 
such as fullerenes, graphene flakes and single wall carbon nanotubes with one or more external 
dimension below 1 nm, are considered nanomaterials.41  
The International Organization for Standardization defines a nanomaterial as ‘material with any 
external dimensions in the nanoscale or having internal structure or surface structure in the 
nanoscale’ while the Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks of the 
European Commission defines it as “material with one or more external dimensions, or an internal 
structure, which could exhibit novel characteristics compared to the same material without 
nanoscale features.”42 The ISO definition, like the EU one, is based purely on size, rather than the 
unique properties found at the nanoscale. In general, this approach provides much more 
comprehensive regulation of all nanomaterials. 
The United States has taken a different approach that takes into account not only on size, but also 
on the new properties that arise from manipulating nanoscale materials. According to the U.S. 
National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), “nanotechnology is the understanding and control of 
matter at the nanoscale, at dimensions between approximately 1 and 100 nanometers, where unique 
phenomena enable novel applications. Encompassing nanoscale science, engineering, and 
technology, nanotechnology involves imaging, measuring, modeling, and manipulating matter at this 
length scale.” The SCENIHR, basing their opinion on the United Kingdom’s Royal Society and 
Royal Academy of Engineering definitions, also takes this approach, defining nanotechnology as 
                                                
41 EU Recommendation 2011/696/EU of 18 October 2011 on the Definition of Nanomaterial. 
42 ISO, "Nanotechnologies Vocabulary Part 5: Nano/bio interface" (2011); SCENIHR, "3.2. 
Definitions and Scope: The Appropriateness of Existing Methodologies to Assess the Potential 
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“the design, characterization, production and application of structures, devices and systems by 
controlling shape and size at the nanoscale.” 
Related to problems of definition, the second major problem is the availability, reliability, and 
validity of data on nanotechnology, as shown in the next section.  
The  Problem  of  Data  
The public buildup of nanotechnology’s promise has been spurred in part by widely varying reports 
and data about what it is, what it does, its military and commercial importance and its effects.  
Nanotechnology estimates vary widely according to data collectors (only a few companies and 
individuals), techniques for calculating market size, sources of funding (public and private), and 
effects (security, economic, health and environmental impacts of nanotechnology).  
Nanotechnology has captured the imagination of defense and development officials because of what 
Margaret E. Kosal terms the “hype and horror” scenarios surrounding nanotech development in its 
early years.43 On the “horror” side of the equation, popular fantastical stories of self-replicating 
nanobots run amok led to great concern among nongovernmental organizations and a few arms 
control advocates about the negative implications of this technology. On the “hype side” are claims 
that nanotech would erase scarcity and lead to a global economy of abundance. Such accounts 
promised that nanotech would clean the water and the air, eradicate hunger and poverty, cure 
cancer, remove many of the resource rationale for war and conflict, and end global capitalism 
through local production. The designation of nanotech as a key technology for economic 
development and technological competitiveness by entities ranging from the United States 
government to the United Nations and the World Bank have only added to the hope that nanotech 
will be revolutionary. These factors have created significant demand for data on nanotech: how 
much is being spent, by whom, in what areas, and with what expectation of military, market and 
societal value. The question then becomes: where does this data come from, and is it any good? 
Many news sources cite the outpouring of government and private-sector spending on 
nanotechnology and the growing number of nanotechnology firms and products. There are, 
however, only a few entities that produce the data widely employed in government, media, scholarly, 
                                                
43 Personal communication with Margaret E. Kosal, San Francisco, April 2, 2013. 
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and business assessments, making it difficult to ascertain the data’s quality and comparability as well 
as the actual outcomes the data claims to measure.   
In the nanotechnology field, two private technology consulting firms, Lux Research and Cientifica, 
and one individual, Mihail Roco of the U.S. National Science Foundation, have created the most 
widely used metrics and data for measuring nanotech-competitiveness, nanotech products, and 
nations’ positions in a global nano-hierarchy. These actors have been particularly powerful in 
shaping international and national investments in nanotechnology. Their influence in shaping public 
and commercial perspectives is problematic, given the lack of a precise definition of nanotechnology 
and in that these actors employ quite different methodologies.44 Their data are used by virtually 
every national government in comparing their national position with others, even though senior U.S. 
government officials are aware that their data and methodology may be questionable.45 The OECD, 
recognizing this issue, has recently entered into the compilation of nanotechnology metrics, and 
began publishing data on nanotechnology R&D in 2011.46 The OECD, in turn, depends to a large 
degree on methodologies developed by three academics, Alan Porter, Philip Shapira and Jan Youtie, 
of the Georgia Institute of Technology in the United States.47 These metrics include the following: 
market value of nanotechnology; government, higher education, and business expenditures on R&D; 
                                                
44 ETC Group, “Geopiracy: The Case Against Geoengineering,” (2012) gives a good break down of 
the different methodologies used by these firms. To further complicate matters, Lux Research 
stopped compiling nano-specific data in 2010. According to Roco, Lux Research does not include 
the electronics sector in its data, a sector where nanotechnology has been used for a number of years 
to increase performance. Anne Clunan, personal communication with Mihail Roco, Washington, 
DC, May 30, 2013. 
45Anne Clunan, personal communication with Mihail Roco, Washington, DC, May 30, 2013; Anne 
Clunan, personal communication with five senior members of the U.S. Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP) Nanoscale Science, Engineering, and Technology (NSET) Subcommittee 
and the National Nanotechnology Coordination Office (NNCO), Washington, DC, May 31, 2013. 
See for example, PCAST, " Report to the President and Congress on the Fourth Assessment of the 
National Nanotechnology Initiative. President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology" 
(2012)  
46 OECD, “OECD, Science Technology, and Industry Scorecard,” 2011. 
47 The U.S. President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) in 2012 began 
using their work as well, which was identified to me by a member of the NSET Subcommittee as 
“good” data. Academics more generally rely on Porter, Shapira and Youtie, as they have produced 
the most comprehensive and methodologically rigorous metrics regarding nanotech activity, both in 
quantity and quality of patents (Philip Shapira and J. Youtie, "The Economic Contributions of 
Nanotechnology to Green and Sustainable Growth" (2012); Alan L. Porter et al., "Refining Search 
Terms for Nanotechnology,"  Journal of Nanoparticle Research 10 (5):715–728 (2007). 
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number of nanotechnology firms and employees in a country; patent applications and patents issued 
involving nanotechnology; and publications in scholarly journals on nanotechnologies. 
Metrics  Matter  
Metrics of countries’ technological competitiveness in emerging technologies shape national policy 
and the structure of international comparisons of competitiveness and technological developments, 
despite official recognition that the indices and measures used in calculating countries’ position are 
problematic.48 Estimates can vary wildly, as, for example, “in 2007, the market value for nano was 
either $11.6 billion or $147 billion, depending on whom you consult.”49 In 2001, the U.S. National 
Science Foundation predicted that by 2015 the world market for nanotech would reach $1 trillion, 
while Lux Research predicted that by 2020 nanotech products would have a $3 trillion market value. 
As of 2010, “current developments,” according to NSF senior advisor for nanotechnology Mihail 
Roco, “presage a burgeoning economic impact: trends suggest that the number of nanotechnology 
products and workers worldwide will double every three years, achieving a $3 trillion market and 6 
million workers by 2020.”50  
While projections indicate that expenditures on nanotechnology have risen to over $1 trillion, it is 
unclear what this actually means in terms of markets, innovation, products, and security applications.  
The data available are often drawn from Lux Research and Cientifica, and it is difficult to fully gauge 
what definitions and indicators give rise to their data as well as their interpretation of its significance.  
For example, Lux Research estimates market value of nanotech-enabled products based on the value 
of the finished product, rather than the nanotech component of the overall product. This can lead to 
substantial inflation of the actual market value of nanotech-enabled products. At the same time, Lux 
Research may significantly underestimate the impact of nanotech, if it is true that its data do not 
                                                
48 As one senior member of the NSET Subcommittee put it, one has to be “very careful,” as the data 
is “all over the map,” and often compares “apples to olives.” Anne Clunan, personal 
communication, May 31, 2013.  
49 ETC Group, “Geopiracy: The Case Against Geoengineering,” 2010, p. 7. 
50 Mihail Roco, Nanotechnology research directions for societal needs in 2020 retrospective and outlook. Edited by 
Chad A. Mirkin, Mark C. Hersam and SpringerLink (United States] Dordrecht ; New York: United 
States : World Technology Evaluation Center ; Dordrecht ; New York : Springer, 2011a); Mihail 
Roco, "The long view of nanotechnology development: the National Nanotechnology Initiative at 
10 years.(Editorial)(Report),"  Journal of Nanoparticle Research: An Interdisciplinary Forum for Nanoscale 
Science and Technology 13 (2):427 (2011b), p. ii. 
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include electronics applications.51 These data are an indicator, yet are only a small piece of a much 
larger and more complicated picture. Much nanotechnology is still largely in the research and 
development stage, and firms only began outpacing governments in their investments into this 
technology in 2006 or 2009. Given the large and often fatal “valley of death” between R&D and 
successful commercialization of new technologies, it is unclear what the existing data mean for 
national security, economic competitiveness, or nanotech governance, to which we now turn.  
III.  NANOTECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE: NOTABLE FOR ITS ABSENCE 
The potential for nanotech and other emerging technologies to disrupt national industries and 
revolutionize military affairs raises the long-standing trade-off states face between sustaining 
economic innovation and maintaining national security and safety. The policy challenge entails 
encouraging the proliferation of nanoscience and nanotechnology and cultivating safe development 
and commercialization of nanotech-based products, while regulating in order to prevent malfeasant 
uses and mitigate against harmful effects of this technology. One of the most striking findings of 
this project is that, to date, there is a notable absence of concern over regulating nanotechnologies 
with military applications. Despite the significant military potential and possible toxicity of 
nanoparticles, there has been very little effort made to develop national or multilateral regulations 
that specifically regulate nanotechnologies.  
Of the potential harms to public safety and national security that can arise from the civilian and 
military applications of nanotech, the primary focus of regulatory concern has been on 
environmental, health and safety effects. A very few have focused on the possibility of nano-targeted 
delivery of biological or chemical agents.52 For others, the concern is less about devices produced, 
than the factories themselves, as scientists are working on molecular-scale components that 
spontaneously “self-assemble.”53 Nano-factories theoretically could produce complex products and 
even duplicate themselves, revolutionizing manufacturing (and the industrial capacity for war) 
                                                
51 Mihail Roco says that Lux Research does not include electronics in its data collection. Anne 
Clunan personal communication with Mihail Roco, May 30, 2013. 
52 Jürgen Altmann, Military nanotechnology : potential applications and preventive arms control, (New York: 
Routledge, 2006); Margaret E. Kosal, Nanotechnology for chemical and biological defense, (New York: 
Springer, 2009). 
53 (Initiative); NATO, “Committee Reports Annual Session 179 STCMT 05 E - The Security 
Implications of Nanotechnology” (2005) 
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through exponential increases in efficiency, decreased failure rates, and radically lowered cost. A 
trillion computers would occupy a cubic centimeter. This has led some to call for preventive arms 
control regimes to govern nanotechnologies,54 and others to advocate for an Inner Space Treaty, 
governing atomic and molecular space.55 
This concern only grows as emerging scientific disciplines, particularly, nano-, bio-, and information 
technologies, converge to generate new trans-disciplinary research and applications.56  As with 
biological weapons, almost all of the equipment and materials needed to develop dangerous 
nanotech-enabled weapons have legitimate uses in a wide range of scientific research and industrial 
activity.  Examples include synthesized viruses (synthetic polio), delivery and dispersal, and 
manipulation of microbes.  As a result, the governance challenge posed by nanotechnology is 
significant. 
MULTILATERAL  REGULATORY  REGIMES  FOR  DUAL-­‐‑USE  TECHNOLOGIES  
There is no current effort to create a multilateral regulatory regime specifically for nanotechnologies. 
This reflects the current understanding that nanotechnology does not pose significant mass 
destructive or disruptive potential.57 Instead, existing formal and informal regulatory regimes that 
govern dual-use technologies are currently being extended to nanotechnologies. Nanotechnology’s 
military applications with mass destructive or disruptive capabilities are most likely to arise in the 
chemical and biological spheres, which are increasingly indistinguishable from each other with the 
interdisciplinary development of synthetic biology.58 The existing formal multilateral regimes in these 
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Knowledge, Technology, and Society: Beyond Convergence of Nano-Bio-Info-Cognitive 
Technologies." World Technology Evaluation Center, Inc., 2013. 
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areas are the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. 
The Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in 2013 looked at 
nanotechnology implications for the Chemical Weapons Convention.  It concluded that,  
As with advances in synthetic biology, nanotechnology has the potential for application to 
purposes prohibited by the Convention. The enhanced delivery of therapeutic drugs to their 
biochemical target could be exploited for the delivery of toxic chemicals. The concern for 
nanoparticles with significantly enhanced acute toxicity compared to larger particles has not 
been substantiated, although this is still under investigation. No nanomaterials are currently 
known to have an intrinsic toxicity that might make them attractive for use in chemical 
weapons. The risk to the Convention posed by nanomaterials is, therefore, currently 
regarded as low. The prevailing view of the [Scientific Advisory Board] is that nanotechnology is 
unlikely to provide a dramatic improvement in the military utility of existing chemical agents, but it could be 
exploited in the development of new agents.59 
In terms of export control regimes, nations have been reluctant to significantly proscribe 
nanotechnology exports for competiveness reasons. U.S. companies, such as Zyvex Technologies, 
that were told that their CNT-enabled technology was subject to control under the U.S. munitions 
list (International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), administered by the U.S. Department of 
State), threatened to move their production overseas.60 The significance of such threats prompted 
the U.S. President’s Export Council to reject unilateral controls on any nanotechnologies without 
“clear military and national security applications,” stating that export controls would have to be 
“multilateral in order to be effective.”61  
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The general concern over eliminating U.S. national competitiveness in nanotechnologies has led to 
the reorganization of U.S. export controls under the Export Control Reform Initiative, such that 
almost all dual-use technologies, including nano-enabled ones, as of October 2013, now fall under 
the purview of the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security’s Commerce Control 
List (CCL). According to the Department of State,  
The CCL includes the following:  
• Items on Wassenaar Arrangement Dual-Use List 
• Nuclear-related dual use commodities (compiled in the Nuclear Suppliers Group's 
Nuclear Referral List) 
• Dual-use items on Missile Technology Control Regime List 
• CW Precursors, biological organisms and toxins, and CBW-related equipment on the 
Australia Group lists 
• Items controlled in furtherance of U.S. foreign policy and other objectives, including 
anti-terrorism, crime control, Firearms Convention, regional stability, UN sanctions, and 
short supply reasons 
• Unlisted items when destined for specified end-uses or end-users (catch-all controls).62 
 
The Wassenaar Arrangement Dual-Use List contains two nanotech items: nanocrystalline alloy strips 
and nano-imprint lithography tools; it also lists 14 instances of equipment producing items at 200 
nm or less. There is no mention of nanotechnology on the Wassenaar Munitions List.63 The Russian 
Federation lists the same two items, and a slightly broader listing of nanoscale equipment.64 The 
Nuclear Suppliers Group lists one dual-use nanoscale item, Alexandrite lasers, in its Guidelines for 
Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology.65 The Australia Group 
lists also do not specifically refer to nanotech, though they do specify genetically modified organisms 
or chemically synthesized genetic elements associated with the pathogenicity of microorganisms and 
toxins on their lists.66 The U.S. reliance on the CCL has led to criticism that this new laxity in U.S. 
                                                
62 U.S. Department of State, “Overview of U.S. Export Control System.” June 15, 2014. 
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export controls has “the potential to exacerbate weapons proliferation and undermine American 
security.”67 
DIFFERENT  APPROACHES  TO  NANOTECH  RISK  AND  REGULATORY  IMPLICATIONS  
As previously noted, the lack of consensual definitions means that the data collected and used to 
estimate nanotechnology’s economic, security, and safety potential and risk is often based on 
different meanings and measures of nanomaterial, nanoparticle, and nanotechnology. Questionable 
data, competing definitions, different risk perceptions, and economic competition significantly 
complicate efforts to find national, let alone international standards upon which to base 
nanotechnology regulations. These factors have to date prevented the establishment of global 
statistical definitions of nanomaterials on which to base private commercial regulatory standards and 
the establishment of consensual global norms over nanotechnology governance. As a result, 
countries are pursuing different approaches to national regulation of nanotechnologies, based in 
large measure on whether to apply a “wait-and-see” or precautionary approach to the potential risks 
arising from nanotechnologies and their manufacture.   
Currently, the biggest principled difference in global regulation lies between the European Union 
and the United States. “Even though the US and the EU are not consistent in the use of precaution 
in domestic regulation, they have come to occupy opposing positions in international regulatory 
debates. While the US has repeatedly insisted that regulatory trade restrictions should be based on 
‘sound science’ in line with WTO law, the EU has pushed for the global expansion of precautionary 
standards and a re-balancing of the relationship between WTO rules and environmental policies in 
favor of the latter.”68  
 
The EU has been much more proactive than the United States in establishing environmental, health 
and safety regulations, particularly through the 2007 law regulating chemicals Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH). In contrast, U.S. regulation has 
been based on a thirty-year-old law, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TCSA). The EPA in 2006 
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decided that nanosilver constitutes a pesticide and requires registration. In 2008, it ruled that CNTs 
constitute a new chemical under the TCSA. However, in 2007, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) rejected nano-specific labeling requirements. 
The EU definition of nanomaterial discussed earlier does not distinguish between engineered 
nanomaterials, which have an identifiable producer that can be addressed, and naturally occurring 
nanomaterials, including diesel soot or wood smoke, which are harder to trace and thus regulate. 
This has led to concerns over regulatory requirements, as it may change the requirement from one 
where only engineered nanoparticles be labeled as nanomaterials to one that includes products 
containing naturally occurring nanoparticles.69 In its approach, the EU appears to be relying on the 
precautionary principle with respect to nascent nanotechnology regulation. The U.S. definition of 
nanomaterial, in contrast would exclude naturally occurring nanomaterials from regulation, an 
approach presently taken by the U.S. FDA.70 The United States generally is following a piece-meal 
approach to nanotech regulation. In contrast to the EU, the USG has been more risk-acceptant of 
commercial nanotech-applications, though this approach successfully challenged.71 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) plays a central role in establishing the 
commercial standards that allow product certification. Without a set of agreed nanotech standards, 
countries and industries are presently engaged in a competition to set these standards in ways that 
advantage their domestic industries.72 These actors have also focused on voluntary governance 
mechanisms to avoid the introduction of nano-specific regulations that might impede innovation 
and competitiveness. 
BOTTOM-­‐‑UP  REGULATION  OF  NANOTECHNOLOGY    
In general, the existing atmosphere regarding regulation of nanotechnology stresses individual and 
corporate responsibility, rather than government intervention. In part because of the immense 
difficulties in defining, monitoring and verifying the development, manufacturing, transfer and use 
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of these emerging technologies—characteristics that nanotechnologies share with biotechnologies--
there is little effort underway to introduce government regulation aimed at limiting dual-use items. 
Unlike the case of chemical weapons, where the chemical industry was a key participant in the 
drafting of the Chemical Weapons Convention, in biotechnology, there has been no such 
collaborative attitude.73 Instead, efforts have been made since 1975 to develop voluntary codes of 
conduct for industry and academics to self-regulate and self-censor.74 The same currently applies to 
nanotechnology. Corporations and some scholarly enthusiasts have championed these private 
regulatory regimes in order to avoid government involvement.75  
Several voluntary frameworks currently exist in the nanotech field. These are The Nano Risk 
Framework developed by the Environmental Defense Fund and DuPont; the Nano Code developed in 
the United Kingdom; the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Nanoscale Materials Stewardship 
Program; the U.K. government’s Voluntary Reporting Scheme for Engineered Nanoscale Materials; the 
commercially driven Assured Nano accreditation scheme; the 2008 EU Commission 
Recommendation on a Code of Conduct for Responsible Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies 
Research.76 “This voluntary code of conduct aims to guide the actions of member states in the 
promotion of innovation and research, particularly regarding ‘integrated, safe and responsible 
nanosciences and nanotechnologies research in Europe for the benefit of society as a whole’.”77 
The cumulative effect of these efforts is that normative and regulatory frameworks surrounding 
nanotechnology are increasingly viewed as the responsibility of individual corporations and 
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scientists. Governance of emerging technologies is devolving downwards, with very little interest in 
developing international norms or agreements to govern nanotech production and use.78 This 
attitude stems largely from perceived economic imperatives facilitate innovation and 
commercialization in the three high tech sectors seen as critical to technological leadership and 
competitiveness in the 21st century: nanotechnology, biotechnology, and information and 
communications technology. The next section of the report describes the global landscape of 
nanotechnology R&D, a picture that highlights the extent to which how nanotechnology has 
captured the imagination of national governments as a key to progress. 
IV.  THE GLOBAL LANDSCAPE OF NANOTECHNOLOGY R&D 
Over sixty countries adopted national nanotechnology initiatives between 2000 and 2012 (see Figure 
1, p. 27).  These countries range from advanced industrial countries to emerging markets. The 
adoption of country-specific, coordinated nanotechnology R&D programs began at the turn of the 
millennium, with the United States’ creation of the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) in 
2000. In the same year, Sweden created a nanotechnology initiative. A veritable explosion of NNIs 
happened immediately following these two countries, with twelve nations establishing some sort of 
national program in 2001. Countries as diverse as Luxembourg, Estonia, China, Canada, and Japan 
developed new programs. From then on, as shown in Figure 1, a steady stream of countries created 
national nanotechnology programs, with the most recent adopters being Australia (2010) and Iraq 
(2012).   
WHY  THE  RAPID  GLOBAL  DIFFUSION  OF  NATIONAL  NANOTECHNOLOGY  INITIATIVES?  
The diffusion of nanotechnology initiatives occurred within a very condensed period of time. In a 
period of 12 years, more than 60 countries created nanotech initiatives. Why do we see this rapid 
adoption of NNIs across such a diverse group of countries?  
Conventional wisdom in political science and business focuses on the role of political and economic 
power in the international system, or at least market power, and would expect large countries to be 
leaders in the adoption of nanotechnology. One would expect a small group of high-income 
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adopters at the beginning, followed by a period of low activity, then a wave of adoption some years 
later, with laggards joining in after the trend has caught on. The trend for nanotech, in contrast, 
seems to be a consistent and steady rise in adoption.79 The patterns of which countries are leading 
the charge in nanotech R&D and when they adopt national nanotechnology initiatives are 
anomalous in terms of expected technology diffusion patterns, as well as the diffusion of liberal 
economic policies.80 There is very little correlation at all in terms of size of government investment 
in nanotech R&D and the timing of adopting a new national nanotechnology initiative. Nor is there 
a readily identifiable leader/laggard distinction among nations; instead there is a growing trend that 
transcends traditional geographic or political expectations. For example, while it makes sense 
substantively that Japan, the United States, and Sweden adopted national nanotechnology initiatives 
in 2000, it is not obvious why such different small countries as Singapore, Estonia, Ireland, and 
Romania adopted programs in the following year, or why Armenia, Pakistan, and Belarus adopted 
programs in 2002. Further, Germany has one of the largest nanotechnology markets, yet did not 
adopt a national nanotechnology initiative until 2006, after the EU framework was adopted.  Many 
small countries with very little political power and no market power (e.g. Armenia, Estonia, 
Romania) adopted nanotechnology initiatives in the earliest phases. Geopolitical power does not 
seem to be an easy or obvious answer to why so many countries adopted national nanotechnology 
initiatives in such a short space of time.  
The diverse ways that countries have used nanotechnology initiatives to signal to the global 
community could explain the unusual diffusion pattern. Unlike other technological regulations and 
initiatives, nanotechnology has been is hailed as the basis for a new technological and military 
revolution.81 Political elites widely accept cutting-edge technology as a fundamental source of long-
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term economic growth and national advantage for economic and military prowess. Inherent in their 
concepts of “technological revolutions” and “disruptive technology” is the widespread belief that 
technology drives historical changes in economy, society, politics and war. “As the next major 
technology wave,” according to some, “nanotechnology will be revolutionary in a social and 
economic as well as a scientific and technological sense.”82 For many, the political corollary is that 
states that are able to capture a technological lead will gain significant wealth and military power 
over other states. The United Nations has identified nano-, bio- and information technologies as the 
key platform technologies for growth and development.83 The potential for a nanotechnological 
revolution has inspired grand claims about its promise for development and progress.  
Such promises have distorted the diffusion process, encouraging small, less developed countries to 
jump on the bandwagon, hoping it will help them catch up. According to a leading Latin American 
expert on nanotech, once the United Nations announced in 2005 that nanotech was a key 
technology for development, all the Latin American countries adopted a NNI. For them, it is an 
issue of developmental aspirations and prestige.84 Others see nanotechnology as a security issue, an 
issue of political power or prestige. For countries, such as Brazil, Russia and India, adopting a 
national nanotechnology initiative seems to reflect a strategic signal to global markets and political 
players that a country is seriously considering its role in the world, and acting to pursue its own 
strategic interests and international prestige. In contrast, Germany has minimized the military 
applications of nanotechnology, focusing instead on its commercial promise, suggesting to other 
global players that it does not intend to use nanotechnology for offensive capabilities. China appears 
to be much more focused on the economic growth potential of nanotech than on its military 
applications.85 Still others are less easily swayed by the grand promises of nanotechnology. Many see 
it through multiple lenses. A country that sees nanotechnology as the long-awaited technological 
                                                
82 P. Singer., F. Salamanca-Buentello, and A. Daar, "Harnessing Nanotechnology to improve global 
equity: the less industrialized countries are eager to play an early role in developing this technology; 
the global community should help them," Issues in Science and Technology 21 (4), 2005. 
83 C. Juma and L. Yee-Cheong, "Innovation: Applying knowledge in development," UN Millennium 
Project Task force on Science, Technology and Innovation (2005)  
84 Anne Clunan, personal communication with Noela Invernizzi, Boston, Mass., October 25, 2013. 
85 Anne Clunan, personal communication with senior member of the NSET subcommittee, 
Washington, D.C., May 31, 2013. See also the report’s case studies of China. 
 	  	   27 
revolution and key to modernity will approach adoption differently than a country that sees it as 
only an issue of security or hardly an issue at all. 
Figure 1. Worldwide spread of national nanotechnology initiatives, 1990-2014 
 
Source: Kirsten Rodine-Hardy Research Team 2014; original dataset compiled from publicly available sources. 
 
The report next focuses on some of these different approaches, first with a brief snapshot of Brazil, 
China, India, and Russia, then takes a closer look at European Union trends and the EU’s two 
biggest nanotech markets, Germany and the United Kingdom, and examines in depth the case of 
China. 
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A  QUICK  LOOK  AT  NANOTECH  ADOPTION  IN  BRAZIL,  CHINA,  INDIA  AND  RUSSIA  
As of 2011, China, India, and Russia all had “full-fledged nanotechnology policies involving dozens 
of institutions, hundreds of research and education centers and large amounts of R&D spending.”86 
Brazil has also made a concerted investment in nanotechnology. 
BRAZIL established its national nanotechnology initiative in 2004-2005. Brazil has declared 
nanotechnology to be one of eleven areas for strategic government investment. The Ministry of 
Science, Technology and Culture invested an average of $5 million a year in nanotech over the 
course of 2004-2008.87  According to Kay and Shapira, “Brazil, although perhaps a third-tier country 
in nanotechnology output at the worldwide level, is clearly the leader in terms of nanotechnology 
publications in the [Latin American] region. Brazil contains about one-third of all scientists in Latin 
America (UNESCO 2005) and contributes more than 50% of the continent’s nanotechnology 
research output.”88 Brazil’s government has focused attention on technology transfer, in order to 
increase the number of patents associated with nanotech research.89 According to experts, in Brazil 
there is a “fever” regarding patents, and the government’s is pushing universities and corporations to 
establish nanotech patents purely for prestige, as they have no commercial application. 90 
Nanotechnology is “now the high science in Brazil”, according to Paulo Martins. As of 2012, there 
were 17 nanotech networks established in Brazil, and eight national labs, over 2,500 researchers and 
3,000 graduate students were focused on nanotech. The Brazilian government reportedly views 
                                                
86 Evegeny A. Klochikihin, "Public policy instruments in (re)building national innovation capabilities: 
cases of nanotechnology development in China, Russia and Brazil," Atlanta Conference on Science 
and Innovation Policy, Atlanta, GA, 2011. 
87 E. O’Rourke and M. Morrison, "Challenges for Governments in Evaluating Return on Investment 
from Nanotechnology and Its Broader Economic Impact," OECD Background Paper (2012) 
88 Luciano Kay and Philip Shapira, "The Case of Brazil," Nanotechnology and the Challenges of Equity, 
Equality and Development, edited by Susan E. Cozzens and Jameson Wetmore (Springer, 2011). 
89 E. O’Rourke and M. Morrison, "Challenges for Governments in Evaluating Return on Investment 
from Nanotechnology and Its Broader Economic Impact," OECD Background Paper, (2012) 
90 Anne L. Clunan, personal communication with Luciano Kay and Noela Invernizzi, Boston, Mass, 
October 28, 2013. 
 	  	   29 
nanotechnology investments as imperative for increasing Brazil’s S/T base and its international 
competitiveness.91  
CHINA has designated nanotech R&D as one of twelve “mega-projects” under its Medium and 
Long Term Development Plan 2006-2020. 92 China has stepped up publishing and patenting in 
nanotechnology in order, by some accounts, to increase their ranking in global nanotechnology 
indices.93 The head of the Chinese Academies of Science is a nanotechnology scientist, and China 
has “come up very quickly academically, its labs are very good,” according to a senior U.S. official.94 
A much closer look at China’s nanotechnology programs is provided later in the report. 
INDIA established a Nano Science and Technology Initiative in 2001, but with modest support and 
aims. In 2005, an Indian Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) official stated 
that India was set to become a “leader in nanotechnology within the next five to ten years.”95 In 
2007, India launched a new Mission on Nano Science and Technology (Nano Mission) under the 
Department for Science and Technology, with a budget of approximately $145 million over five 
years. The Nano Mission funds basic research and development equally, and focuses on water 
sanitation and drug delivery.96 President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, himself a rocket scientist, was and 
remains one of the chief promoters of India’s investments in nanotech; in 2009 he stated that, “we 
believe that nanotechnology would give us an opportunity, if we take an appropriate and timely 
action to become one of the important technological nations in the world.”97  India is one of very 
few countries to highlight military applications of nanotech, though its primary emphasis has been 
on development. The Scientific Advisor to the Indian Minister of Defense highlighted some of these 
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applications in 2012: “Nanotechnology should lead to higher protection, more lethality, longer 
endurance and better self-supporting capacities of future combat soldiers. Substantial advantages are 
expected to be gained, which include threat detection, novel electronic display and interface systems, 
as well as a pivotal role for the development of miniaturized unmanned combat vehicles and 
robotics. Nanotechnology will also enable small portable sensor systems capable of identifying 
chemical, biological, nuclear, radiation, or explosive threats.”98 
RUSSIA, one of the last entrants in the nanotech cascade, dropped a figurative as a well as literal 
“nano-bomb” in 2007, with the establishment of a $9 billion state-funded nanotechnology initiative, 
and the detonation of a thermobaric “father of all bombs” that the Russian government claimed was 
the first nano-weapon.99 The Russian nanotech program has been pushed at the highest levels, 
beginning with President Vladimir Putin. “In his [2007] annual address to the Federal Assembly, 
Putin singled out nanotechnology as the locomotive of Russia’s scientific and technological 
development strategy.”100 Former Defense Minister and then First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei 
Ivanov, in noting that half of Russian scientists work in the military industrial complex and seventy-
percent of scientific production is military in nature, said in 2007 that nanotechnology “can 
drastically change all of our perceptions about modern warfare.”101 Russia has also established a 
government-controlled nanotechnology venture capital firm, RUSNANO, to invest in and acquire 
nanotechnology start-ups around the world. Russia, more than any other country, emphasizes the 
offensive as well as defensive military applications of nanotech, perhaps because military might is 
widely viewed as the key source of Russia’s international status.102  
The Russian Ministry for Science and Education issued a development program for Russian nano-
industries in 2007 that was create a competitive nanotech R&D sector by 2011. This sector would 
“make it possible for the Russian Federation to achieve scientific-technical parity with the developed 
nations in the world. By 2011, new nanotechnology products were to have been developed that 
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could be industrially produced within two to three years, and an efficient system for their 
commercialization established. The ultimate goals were to have laid the foundations for a large-scale 
increase in the production volumes of new types of nano-industry products by 2015, and to have 
established Russian companies in the global high technology market.”103 The development program 
also laid out publishing and patenting targets. Nano-electronics, engineering, materials (for energy, 
space, construction use), biotech and security systems were designated as priority R&D areas.104  The 
Russian Federation in 2011 devoted the most government and higher education expenditures to 
nanotechnology R&D, at 5.6% or USD729 million PPP.105 These expenditures, together with 
RUSNANO’s activities, have made Russia a highly visible player in the nanotechnology field.  While 
this highly visible push into nanotechnology has placed Russia in the top ten government sponsors 
of nanotech R&D, the quantity and quality of Russian nanotech (and more generally) patenting and 
publications remain low.106 
In marked contrast to Russia, where the defense sector has long been the source of Russian 
innovation, nanotechnology and security in the European Union present a more complicated 
picture. Traditional realist assumptions, which emphasize the importance of relative national power 
and the necessity for strong military capacity, do not capture the shifting security dynamics in the 
EU nor the regulatory frameworks that are evolving around dual-use nanotechnologies. The next 
section turns to the relationship between nanotechnology innovation and security in Europe; it 
begins with the European Union then attends to the two largest nanotechnology markets in Europe: 
Germany and the United Kingdom. 
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THE  EUROPEAN  UNION  
Security policy in Europe has taken on a distinctly regional rather than national framework, through 
the establishment of agreements such as the EU Common Security and Defense Policy and 
institutions such as the European Defence Agency (EDA). Over the past three decades, there has 
been a shift in regulatory authority away from states towards governance of military and security 
concerns at the European and international levels through participation in NATO and the EU.  This 
trend of increasingly limited national authority can be reflected in the reduced defense expenditures 
of EU countries. Since the 1960s, defense spending as a percentage of GDP across EU states has 
decreased by nearly 70% and now averages around 2% of GDP.107 Even amongst the most powerful 
and influential states in Europe, including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, there has 
been a significant reduction in national defense spending and an increased focus on regional security.  
Several European-wide initiatives have been proposed which bring together member states and EU 
institutions in a collaborative effort to promote the R&D of nanotechnology for security purposes. 
In 2006, European governments in collaboration with the EDA established a two-year Joint 
Investment Programme (JIP) to promote collaborative R&D efforts on emerging defensive 
technologies, including nanotechnologies. In 2008, a second two-year JIP was agreed upon which 
included advisors from eleven EU member states and was funded by a common budget of €15.5 
million. 108  These efforts represent a multilateral approach to defense that relies upon the 
contributions and commitments of various members and is focused upon regional rather than 
strictly national security concerns. An important feature of these programs has been an emphasis on 
the expansion of nanotechnology markets not only for security, but also for commercial purposes, 
including the development and production of new nano-material structures, novel medicines and 
therapeutic treatments, and alternative energy sources. Since many of these products have potential 
dual-use applications, the growth of a diversified nanotechnology market in Europe is seen as 
beneficial from both an economic and security perspective. 
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In a 2012 roundtable on the strategic importance of Europe's nano-electronic sector, Michael Sieber, 
the assistant director for research and technology at the EDA stated, “without the nano-electronics 
sector there would be no viable defense sector, and without defense, investment in nano-electronics 
would not be feasible.”109 This statement highlights the interdependencies that exist between security 
and economic concerns at the European level. According to the EDA, in order to ensure the 
development and production of the next generation of nano-electronics, used for a range of defense 
purposes including satellites, communications, and computing, it is critical to establish a sustainable 
and globally competitive nanotechnology market in Europe.110 Fostering a strong nanotechnology 
sector would help to ensure continued investment in R&D and promote innovations critical for 
both economic growth and regional defense. The EDA has also funded projects to establish 
specialized European supply chains to alleviate concerns about access to critical resources, which 
may be subject to export restrictions, and the supply of vital materials that are produced at limited 
volumes.111 To achieve this objective of a thriving EU nanotechnology market requires strategic 
planning and commitment on behalf of a range of stakeholders at multiple levels including EU 
policymakers, government representatives, and firms. 
Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom:  Divergent  National  Styles  of  Nano  Innovation  and  
Security  
By Ian McManus 
The complex relationship between nanotechnology security and economic concerns plays out at the 
country as well as the European level, shaped by longstanding national regulatory styles. States hold 
different policy preferences and attitudes about the role of the state in defining security and 
economic policies. This study focuses on the two biggest markets for nanotechnology in the 
European Union, Germany and the United Kingdom, to evaluate how different national histories 
affect nanotech policy. These differences are based on distinct historical experiences, political 
institutions, and economic structures which shape actor preferences. Examining these national 
differences from a comparative perspective provides a useful overview of the evolving nature of 
nanotechnology governance concerns and helps to explain the different approaches states have 
                                                
109 EDA, "European Defence Agency News: Nanoelectronics’ Importance for Defence." (2012) 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
 	  	   34 
taken to promote the R&D of dual-use technologies. Despite dissimilar national security positions, 
the German and UK cases highlight a significant shift away from direct military spending on defense 
toward market-driven strategies of nanotechnology R&D for commercial purposes, with profound 
implications for the security realm. 
Germany    
German security policy has been deeply shaped by the country’s historical experience and its 
political institutions, which have placed significant constraints on military efforts and defense 
spending. Since the end of World War II, the German policy position on security issues has reflected 
a desire for multilateralism and international cooperation. In terms of international security policy, 
Germany has largely been in favor of greater European integration and regional decision-making.112 
This position is reflected in public support for an EU Common Defence and Security Policy that is 
significantly higher in Germany than in other member states, such as the United Kingdom.113 Even 
the concept of domestic policy based on “national interest” remains deeply controversial within 
Germany, as it implies that German interests might differ or be at odds with European or global 
interests. Reflecting historical experience, the German public has also remained wary of security 
policies that utilize offensive strategies that might allow Germany to be perceived as an aggressor. 
In addition to the influence of historical antecedents and public opinion pressure, German security 
policy is further constrained by its federal institutions and by its consensus-driven political system. 
There are numerous checks and balances within the German federal government that limit the 
power of the executive and which result in greater consensus-building in defining foreign and 
security policies.114 The result is an inclusive decision-making process with a high degree of local and 
regional representation in national-level legislation policies.115 In addition to the involvement of 
various stakeholders in the legislative process, the executive branch is also responsive to the needs 
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and interests of various constituencies. The German Chancellor is openly constrained by coalition 
politics and the need to appeal to a broad base of interests. 
All of these factors result in a German security policy that can be characterized as passive, reactive, 
and more oriented toward actively seeking international cooperation through multilateral means. 
Despite its economic strength and active leadership role within the EU on social and economic 
policies, when it comes to foreign and security policies Germany takes on a more neutral role relying 
on NATO and EU institutions to define policies. This has led some European allies to view 
Germany as a “reluctant hegemon” within the EU security sector, whose capacities are greater than 
the country’s ambitions to define security policies.116  
This preference for multilateral cooperation and the international governance of security issues has 
prevailed in debates over nanotechnology regulations. In 2004, the German Parliament’s Committee 
for Education, Research, and Technology Assessment of the Consequences of Technology released 
a report which included possible military uses and security risks of nanotechnology. The report 
concluded that immediate short-term security risks of nanotechnology seem unlikely, but 
emphasized the need for strengthened international cooperation to ensure responsible development 
and production and the benefit of multilateral initiatives, similar to measures governing small arms 
and chemical weapons, to limit possible misuse.117 In other words, German government officials 
highlighted the importance of international regulatory regimes over domestic governance strategies 
to address the potential issues of nano-security. Unsurprisingly given this position, whereas some 
countries, such as the United States, allocate portions of their defense budget specifically to the 
development of nanotechnology for security, the German government does not fund the R&D of 
nanotechnology for military applications, even for defensive purposes. 
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117 NATO, "Committee Reports Annual Session 179 STCMT 05 E - The Security Implications of 
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Figure 2. Counts of patent applications in nanotechnology in PATSAT, by year and assignee 
country, 1990-2009 
 
Source: Reproduced from President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) 2012 Report, p. 6. 
Figure 3. Counts of priority patent applications in nanotechnology, by year and assignee 
country, 1990-2009 
 
Source: Reproduced from President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) 2012 Report, p. 7. 
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Yet, Germany has the largest nanotechnology market in Europe with nearly 400 companies involved 
with the development, production, or use of nanomaterials, including chemical and manufacturing 
firms.118 According to the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, nearly half of all EU 
nanotechnology firms are based in Germany.119 Germany is also a leader in nanotechnology research 
filing over 3,730 nanotechnology patents between 2000 and 2010, more than any other country in 
Europe and almost as great as the number of patents filed by the rest of the EU member states 
combined. This sheer volume of nanotechnology patents also makes Germany the top patent-
producing country per capita in Europe (see Figures 2, p. 36 and 3, p. 36). Germany has also led in 
academic research producing 6,449 nanotechnology related publications between 1998 and 2009 an 
average of 7.86 publications per 100,000 residents (see Figure 4, p. 38). This empirical evidence 
suggests a burgeoning nanotechnology sector in Germany that is one of the most robust and 
innovative in Europe. To put this into perspective, Germany produced nearly 2.5 times the number 
of publications and almost 4 times the number of patents as the United Kingdom, the second largest 
market for nanotechnology R&D in the EU.120 
Despite Germany’s reluctance to allocate defense budget resources toward the development of 
nanotechnologies, the federal government is one of the largest sources of funding for 
nanotechnology R&D within the economy. In fact, Germany has the highest public sector 
investment in nanotechnology of any EU member state with its spending second only to the 
European Commission (ObservatoryNANO 2011). Public funding of nanotechnology R&D is 
estimated to be around €500 million ($US 676 million) per year with public investment increasing 
annually between 5-10%. Whereas in other countries, such as the United Kingdom, there is a greater 
proportional investment in nano R&D by the private sector, notably through venture capital 
investments, in Germany the state has taken a prominent role in strengthening nanotechnology as an 
economic sector. German industry, however, is third in the world in terms of its nanotechnology 
investments (see Figures 5 and 6, p. 66). 
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119 ObservatoryNANO, " European Nanotechnology Landscape Report" (2011) 
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Figure 4. Publication counts for nanotechnology 
 
Source: Reproduced from President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) 2012 Report, p. 5. 
The High-Tech Strategy 2020 for Germany released by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
emphasizes nanotechnology as one of the key sectors for future economic growth.121 Strikingly, the 
report also discusses the desire for Germany to become a market leader in security technology 
products and services, including in the fields of biological, chemical, and nano technologies. In other 
words, while the federal government has been reluctant to invest in nanotechnology from a military 
and security perspective, the state has been actively involved in the development of nano-related 
industries even within the security sector to promote economic growth. The government’s position 
on nanotechnology for security purposes therefore has focused less on relative hard power and 
military strength, than on commercial incentives within an increasingly integrated Europe and 
globalized world. 
                                                
121 BMBF, " Nano-Initiative: Action Plan 2010" (2007) 
 	  	   39 
United  Kingdom    
In the United Kingdom, as for most European countries, security and defense concerns have 
become more global, extending beyond the boundaries of the state and requiring international 
cooperation and agreement. National governments in this context no longer exercise sole authority 
over security matters, but coordinate with other states through international organizations at the 
European and global levels. As has been the case throughout Europe, the United Kingdom has 
greatly reduced its defense spending over the past 30 years. 122 However, despite a clear decline in 
military spending, the United Kingdom remains the biggest defense spender in the EU and has been 
one of only two European countries, along with Greece, that has met NATO’s minimal goal of at 
least 2 percent of GDP spending on defense.123 While there has been a reduced role of the state 
overall in international security decision-making and an increased competency at the European and 
international levels, the defense policy position of the United Kingdom differs significantly from 
Germany. In particular, where German security seems intrinsically linked to European security and 
its domestic objectives are primarily pursued through multilateral means, the U.K. government has 
sought to retain its capacity to act independently whenever its national interest are at stake. Though 
committed to its international partners, the United Kingdom has sought separate bilateral 
agreements with the both the United States and France and has even undertaken unilateral troop 
deployments in recent years, an action that would not be a viable option in Germany.124  
In contrast to German foreign and security policy ambitions, which are modest despite its large 
economic size and influence in the EU, the United Kingdom has a strong sense of responsibility for 
international security policy even though globally it can be categorized as a medium-ranking 
economic and military power. In many regards, this willingness to become directly involved 
diplomatically, economically and militarily has been shaped by the United Kingdom’s history as a 
world power and its continued position as a permanent member of the United Nations Security 
Council. This position of continued involvement in international security issues has been identified 
in the 2010 UK National Security Strategy. Passages such as, “Britain’s national interest requires us 
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to reject any notion of the shrinkage of our influence” make clear the desire of the British state to 
maintain an active role in world security affairs.125 Public opinion has also supported a more 
independent role of the United Kingdom and remained somewhat skeptical of an overall EU 
Common Defense and Security Policy. In addition to differences in historical experience and public 
perceptions about state involvement in international security affairs, compared to the German 
federal system, the UK government is less constrained by separation of powers. Policymaking takes 
place primarily at the national level with the Prime Minister exercising a great deal of influence.126 As 
a result, the governing party has significant ability to pursue its own foreign and security policy 
agendas. 
Reflecting this more active role of the state in security policy, the United Kingdom does not share 
the same proscriptions against funding nanotechnology R&D for defense purposes as Germany. In 
absolute terms, the United Kingdom is the largest spender on defense R&D within Europe spending 
nearly €4.3 billion ($US 5.8 billion) in 2001. However, corresponding with overall defense spending 
cuts, the amount of funds dedicated to defense-related R&D has decreased by more than half to 
€1.9 billion ($US 2.57 billion) by 2011. 127  The UK Ministry of Defense (MOD) allocates 
approximately £1.5 million ($US 2.4 million) per annum for the development of nanotechnology for 
security.128 It is important to note however, that nano-related expenditures account for only 0.35% 
of the annual national scientific research defense budget and that the MOD considers the 
development of nanotechnology in the United Kingdom to be driven mainly by commercial 
incentives, rather than military imperatives. In other words, although the United Kingdom and 
Germany hold different perspective about the role of the state in security matters and have divergent 
defense policy positions, nanotechnology R&D in both countries is primarily pursued for economic 
gains rather than security needs. 
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Second only to Germany, the United Kingdom has one of the largest nanotechnology markets in 
Europe with nearly 250 firms involved with the development and production of nanomaterials and 
chemicals.129 The United Kingdom is a leader in science and technology research and is one of the 
top publication-producing countries in Europe with 2,688 articles published between 1998 and 2009. 
The United Kingdom is also a leader in nano-related patents with 942 patents filed between 2000 
and 2010 (See Figures 2 and 3, p. 36).130 This makes the United Kingdom one of the most highly 
advanced markets for nanotechnology R&D within the EU. As has been the case in Germany, 
nanotechnology R&D has received considerable support and funding from the national government 
through public institutions including the Higher Education Funding Council for England and the 
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council. In addition to public funding, private 
investment has played an important role in the United Kingdom advancing nanotechnology research 
and providing capital for small business enterprises producing nanotechnology related goods and 
services.  
While it is difficult to assess the amount of private investment in nanotechnology R&D, there are 
indications that the UK market has more diversified sources of funding than Germany, which relies 
primarily on public support for research and production. Corporate funding and venture capital are 
the two primary sources of private investments in nanotechnology R&D. While levels of investment 
for corporations may be similar in both countries, the United Kingdom has a more developed 
venture capital market capable of making investments in R&D. In 2002, venture capital investments 
in the United Kingdom were estimated to be €2.54 billion ($US 3.46 billion) compared with €1.34 
billion ($US 1.83 billion) of investment in Germany (see Figure 6, p. 66).131 This kind of investment 
is particularly valuable at the early start-up and expansion stages helping to fund research activities, 
product development, and marketing and frequently provides equity capital and managerial skills for 
new companies in high-tech and knowledge intensive sectors. This variation in funding 
opportunities for nanotechnology R&D is important, because even though both Germany and the 
United Kingdom are motivated by the potential economic gains of this emerging technology, their 
respective economic structures offer different opportunities for nanotechnology development. 
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CHINA  
When compared to both Germany and the United Kingdom, China exhibits a top-down approach 
to nanotech R&D. China, as the following indicates, prioritizes those technologies, such as 
nanotech, that are seen to have significant strategic value. Even so, China appears to view 
nanotechnology primarily as a means to improve its position economically, pursuing commercial 
nanotechnology applications over military ones.132 This section offers two mini-case studies of 
China’s approach to nanotechnology. Roselyn Hsueh provides the necessary background on 
economic reform in China in order to understand the relationship between strategic technological 
development and the Chinese leadership’s understanding of national security and strategic value. She 
illustrates this relationship with regard to nanotech-enabled textiles, of which China is a leading 
producer. Margaret E. Kosal then paints a detailed picture of China’s approach to nanotechnology 
policy and R&D. Together, these mini-cases provide the broader domestic political and economic 
context for the assessment of China’s perception of nanotechnology as a primarily commercial area 
for development and to give insight into how China will govern commercialization of nanotech-
enabled products.  
China:  The  Domestic  Political  Economy  of  National  Security  and  Nano-­‐‑textiles  
By Roselyn Hsueh 
For reform-era China, technological advancement and infrastructural development cannot be 
disconnected from the state’s concerns for national security.  Security imperatives, in the post-Mao 
and the post–cold war eras, have been maintenance of political regime stability and, relatedly, 
China’s status as the only major “Communist” power in the world with a regional security system 
positioned against it. The Chinese leadership perceives the end of the cold war as the dawn of 
American military leadership in East Asia, targeting regional security against China and exerting 
ideological, if not also political, supremacy elsewhere. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “Chinese 
dream” added civility and environmental protection to the quest for economic power and social and 
political stability as regime goals. In other words, what is considered strategic economically to the 
Chinese government involves security-related calculations that are both internally oriented and 
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geopolitical in nature.133 The bottom line is that Chinese leadership perceives that it must identify 
and manage political, economic, and social forces that might derail external and internal regime 
stability and China’s growth and development. 
Government officials, leaders of commercial sectoral and business associations, and managers of 
state- and privately owned enterprises stress the connection between acquiring national 
technological competence and “making China rich and strong” in the face of unnamed threats.134  
Since the 1980s, the Chinese state introduced market competition on the aggregate level but retained 
centralized control of industries considered strategic to national security (including geopolitics and 
political stability) and with a high contribution to the national technology base.135  Motivated by 
national security concerns and the development of technological capacity, the Chinese state 
perceives as strategic those industries that have applications for maintaining political stability and 
contribute to the national technology base and economic competitiveness.  Informants identify 
security considerations and “royalties, profits, and relative economic gains” as drivers of deliberate 
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state control.136  One informant characterizes the relationship between technological goals and 
security imperatives as “the government’s obsession with economic security.”137   
The Chinese state connects external and internal security concerns with goals of advancing and 
controlling China’s technology infrastructure, disseminating information, and managing labor 
markets.  Various five-year and fifteen-year plans and catalogues for guidance of foreign investment, 
released by the National Development and Reform Commission, have named infrastructural and 
high technology sectors as areas for modernization, which require “absorbing and digesting” FDI 
and foreign technology, and indigenous development. They have also have emphasized domestic 
consumption in addition to export-orientation.138  Funding programs, such as the 1986 National 
High Technology Development Program (863), which includes nanotechnology, have jumpstarted 
basic-science-to-commercialization initiatives.  More recently, the guiding opinion issued by the State 
Council in 2006, identified the keys sectors critical for national security and the survival and 
competitiveness of the economy: military production, electricity (grid and power generation), 
petroleum, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation, and shipping.139   
Nano-­‐‑enabled  industrial  and  technical  textiles    
China is a leading producer of industrial and technical textiles and clothing, which contain nanotech-
enabled components.140 The industrial and technical textile subsectors are economically and militarily 
salient, unlike regular textiles, as they contribute to the Chinese national technology base and have 
applications for construction, aerospace (including air transport and space exploration), and 
significant military uses (as outlined in the above section on “What Is Nanotechnology?”). Tianjin 
Polytechnic University’s Institute for Composite Materials, which produced material for the 
Shenzhen spacecraft, receives funding for basic research in nanoscale carbon fiber, e.g., high 
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performance fiber for military and national security applications.  High performance 
nanotechnology-enabled fiber as key inputs for air, oil, and gasoline filters—with their 
environmental implications—are of particular interest to national-level bureaucracies targeting 
funding for basic research and commercialization.141  
Photo: Astronauts of the Shenzhou VII, the third in China’s space program, wore suits 
containing advanced synthetic fabric developed by Chinese scientists.   
 
Source: Xinhua, 2008; http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-09/25/content_10108562.htm. 
In these subsectors, relevant central-level Chinese bureaucracies collaborate with sector associations 
to distribute limited central funding for R&D and set technical standards to strengthen domestic 
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capacity in man-made fabrics and geosynthetics.142  In addition to the various five-year plans 
specifically naming technical textile sectors as areas of strategic focus (and investment catalogues 
discouraging or forbidding high-polluting sectors), central-level research funding in the 2000s, while 
limited, has focused on technical and industrial transformation and innovation in these 
subsectors.143  “Commercialization,” however, “is at least five to ten years away in nanoparticle 
finish, i.e. stain resistant fabrics; and even then the nonsecurity market is small domestically and 
globally,” according to Pan Ning, professor of Fiber and Polymer Science at U.C. Davis.144  
Strategic  Value  Chinese  Style,  and  the  Political  Origins  of  Nano-­‐‑textile  Regulation    
The strategic value of a sector is a critical determinant of why and how reregulation of economic sectors 
occurs in China; and while that strategic value differs across industries, its determination occurs at 
the national level.145 On the economic dimension, strategic value is defined by a sector’s value input 
in the country’s technological and infrastructural base and the contribution of a given sector to the 
competitiveness of other sectors and the rest of the economy.  A sector’s application for national 
security, including internal political and social stability, external security, and foreign relations, 
characterizes the political dimension of the objective definition of strategic value.146  The scope and 
nature of Chinese market reregulation is shaped by its implications for the political survival of the 
most important decisionmakers, not economic calculations alone. On these objective political and 
economic measures, the nanotechnology-enabled nonwoven fibers and technical textiles subsector 
scores as medium to high in security salience and low to medium in economic salience. The relative 
degree of strategic value has implications for the type of market coordination and level of state 
intervention across capital- and labor-intensive subsectors within textiles. 
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Generally speaking, China reflects openness toward foreign and private entry in labor-intensive 
subsectors and a more deliberate approach in capital-intensive subsectors to maximize gains in areas 
with application for national security and contribution to the national technology base.  It 
relinquishes control of what it perceives as nonstrategic industries and enhances its control of those 
industries considered strategic because of their contribution to national security and the national 
technology base.  The state’s capacity to implement this strategy resides in the Chinese Communist 
Party’s monopoly over personnel management and the devolution of economic power in the 
nonstrategic areas.   
How the Chinese leadership defines strategic value, however, does not always fall neatly within the 
boundaries of objective measures.  Boundaries between the economic and political dimensions blur 
in practice due to the subjectivity with which political leaders and policymakers bring to defining, 
making claims about, and contesting, the strategic value of a sector.  The case of China’s textile 
industries show that analysis of the subjective assessment of “objective” measures of strategic value 
provides critical information about the goals and means of the Chinese state in market governance.  
Taking account of the subjectivity inherent in defining strategic value provides better understanding 
of how the Chinese rank order and create scores on objective measures. 
Based on overall objective measures of national security and technological development, nanotech-
enabled and other technical textiles should be deemed strategic to the Chinese state. In such 
technologically advanced sectors, the state would not be expected to easily introduce market 
competition before considering security implications and would be expected to exercise intervention 
in ways that would contribute to the development of potential applications in military, aerospace, 
and other related areas. Industrial and technical textiles have a high-technology content; some 
product categories are inputs for construction, space, and aviation sectors, which have military 
applications.  Compared to capital-intensive industries, such as telecommunications, the textile 
industry falls on the low end of the technological ladder, but because of potential military and 
aeronautical applications, the strategic value logic expects relevant central ministries to intervene to 
promote industrial upgrading and FDI in high-tech, high-value-added subsectors.  Central and local 
governments would also introduce fiscal and other subsidies to promote the development of high-
tech textile equipment and fabrics, which are sometimes unavailable as imports because of other 
countries’ export restrictions.  
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Prior to the 1980s, the Chinese government had governed textiles with more bureaucratic 
centralization than it had governed telecommunications.  Deliberate state actions beginning in the 
Deng era, however, have recalibrated market coordination and the distribution of property rights to 
maximize the economic benefits and minimize the political costs of more markets and private 
interests in the political economy.  Less concerned about controlling products or services that have 
few applications for national security and low contribution to the national technology base, the 
Chinese government introduced competition in the textile industry in the 1980s and decentralized 
market coordination to local governments and commerce bureaus by the early 1990s.    
The overall low strategic value of textiles and the path-dependent effects of textile’s decentralized 
market governance limit the actual type and amount of central resources devoted to textile sectors 
and issues.147 The dismantling of the Ministry of Textile Industry in 1993 officially relinquished 
central coordination in textiles.  The downgrading of the Ministry of Internal Trade, which 
dominated the distribution of raw and processed textile materials in 1998, further decentralized 
supervision of the industry, as did the corporatization and restructuring of state-owned trading 
companies.  Even as market reforms reinforced centralized coordination in telecommunications, the 
demoted textile offices operated as bureau-level departments with little authority.  These institutional 
developments set the stage for private sector development and a local-stakeholders-initiated surge in 
FDI.  The Chinese state exercises limited sector-specific coordination mechanisms, relying mainly 
on macroeconomic instruments to guide the industry. 
The Chinese case of the textile industry demonstrates that, conforming to the subjective 
understanding of the relative unimportance of textiles, the Chinese government has not significantly 
reregulated the textiles industry, including the nanotech-enabled industrial and technical textiles 
subsectors.  The Chinese central state exercises decentralized engagement in textiles, including 
nanotechnology-enabled ones; it has relinquished state control in industrial developments, 
decentralizing market regulation to local bureaucracies and market actors and introduced 
competition and privatized nearly all market segments and subsectors.  However, conforming to the 
objective measures of strategic value, in technical textile segments, which have heavy reliance on 
nanotechnology-enabled components and significant R&D inputs, Chinese central government 
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funding and limited coordination facilitate research at universities and S/T bureaucracies on specific 
categories critical for designated projects of national importance. These include “super suits” and 
other advanced composite materials involved in China’s space program.   
Despite the objective strategic value of nano-textiles and much national pride in the production of 
“super space suits” using indigenously produced nano-textiles, the Chinese government has not 
exercised significant regulatory control over this industrial sector.  Nano-enabled textile applications 
in military and aerospace notwithstanding, the Chinese government has relinquished state control 
over market developments and extensively liberalized the textile industry, one of the earliest to 
experience deregulation and industrial development driven by nonstate market actors. The 
decentralization of economic decision making, unleashing of market reforms, and selective state 
intervention in value-added textile subsectors has created an agile and flexible export-oriented 
manufacturing base in China and developed domestic capacity in technical textiles. The long-term 
effects of the Chinese strategic-value regulatory strategy have created comparative advantages in 
industrial development.  This strategy has allowed the Chinese government to deploy limited 
resources in sectors and issue areas that matter the most, thereby enhancing overall regulatory 
capacity. By insulating the central government from sectoral interests, the strategic-value strategy has 
also helped ensure the continued survival of China’s authoritarian regime.    
China’s  Institutions  and  Leadership  Policy  in  Nanotechnology  Development    
By Margaret E. Kosal, PhD 
The rapid development of nanotechnology in China is closely tied with the legacy of a centralized 
state planning system in science and technology development since the 1950s. The role of the P.R.C. 
central state is characterized as prioritizing areas of research that could increase the P.R.C.’s 
international status or political goals, and then amassing resources (human capital, funding, and 
administrative support) to achieve breakthroughs in these areas. With respect to nanotechnology, 
China is pioneering to set up a top-down system of steering and coordinating its development at the 
national level. 148 In the National Long- and Medium-Term Plan for Science and Technology 
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Development (2006-2020) enacted by the P.R.C. State Council, the “breakthroughs in the study of 
nanotechnology” is listed as one of the four important scientific research plans in basic research.149 
China’s nanotechnology development and state interest in prioritizing research in nanotechnology 
can be attributed to the influential research conducted by a few key Chinese scientists since the 
1980s. Bai Chunli, now the president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), is one such 
influential figure. Bai graduated from the PhD program of the Institute of Chemistry of CAS in 
1985 and became a postdoctoral scholar at the California Institute of Technology working at the 
prestigious Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). Bai returned to China in 1987 and started a research 
program using the STM (Scanning Tunneling Microscopy) at the CAS, and became one of the first 
scientists in China conducting nanoscale research.  
Since the mid-1980s, the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) and the CAS have 
started supporting research on STM-related research, and gradually wider research topics at the 
nanoscale. 150 In 1986, the National High-Tech Research and Development Program (known as the 
863 Program) was implemented by the then State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC), the 
predecessor of the current Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), singling out research on 
the application of nanomaterials as one priority area in public funding. The 863 Program on the 
whole was implemented through successive Five-Year Plans, and from 1990 to 2002, the Program 
funded over one thousand nanotechnology projects with total funding support of $27 million. 
Specifically, in 1990, the SSTC initiated the 1990-99 10 Year “Climbing Up” Project on 
Nanomaterial Science to support research on nanomaterials, adhering to the goal of the 863 
Program.  
In 1997, Bai was promoted to be an alternate member of the Communist Party of China (CCP) 
Central Committee. In the same year, the SSTC enacted the National Basic Research and 
Development Program, known as the 973 Program, further concentrating support for the 
development of nanomaterials and nanostructures.151 The 973 Program complemented the 863 
Program in research investment, and enhanced the standardization of nanotechnology research. 
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Two notable projects under the 973 Program concerned the standardization for the key 
measurement techniques in nanotechnology (led by Professor Jiang Chao at the National Center for 
Nanoscience and Technology), and Controlled Synthesis of Nanometer-sized Reference Materials 
for Metrology and Measurement (led by Professor Wu Xiaochun at the National Center for 
Nanoscience and Technology).152 In 1998, the CAS piloted its own Knowledge Innovation Program, 
which gave nanotechnology priority in high-tech development and technology transfer. The 
Program mapped out plans for the incubation of high-tech startup companies by institutions 
affiliated with the CAS.153 In 2004, Bai himself was further promoted to be the executive vice-
president of the CAS with full minister rank.  
Besides the advocacy work by prominent research scientists like Professor Bai Chunli who have high 
status both within the science community and the central government, China’s decision to prioritize 
nanotechnology development was also prompted by international exchange in nanotechnology 
research and global competition in government-support initiatives for nanotechnology development. 
As early as 1986, the CAS invited Gerd Binnig and Heinrich Rohrer, two pioneer scientists in 
nanotechnology research who received the Nobel prize for the design of the STM, to visit the CAS 
and exchange information with the CAS scientists.154 Heinrich Rohrer reportedly wrote a letter in 
1993 to then P.R.C. President Jiang Zemin predicting the emergence of nanotechnology in industrial 
development, saying that “future technology belongs to those countries which are wise to accept 
nanoscale as the new standard of technology, and pioneer its research development and use.”155  
In 2000, the United States officially launched the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI). 
According to interviews conducted by Appelbaum et al., the P.R.C. central government “did not 
fully embrace nanotechnology until countries such as the United States had formulated national 
nanotechnology initiatives, which made it easier for Bai and his colleagues to make their case to the 
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scientific and political leadership.” 156  In the same year, the National Steering Committee of 
Nanoscience and Nanotechnology (NSCNN) was established to oversee national policies and 
coordinate funding for all R&D funding organizations in the country, with the head of MOST as the 
director and vice ministers of MOST, the vice president of the CAS, and vice president of the NSFC 
as the vice directors. Members of the NSCNN included government officials from the Ministry of 
Education, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Chinese Academy of 
Engineering (CAE) and the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National 
Defense.  
The following year, the P.R.C. President Jiang Zemin (also the General Secretary of the CCP Central 
Committee) remarked that, “the development of nanotechnology and new materials should be 
regarded as an important task of the development and innovation in science and technology. The 
development and application of nanomaterials and nanotechnology is of strategic significance to the 
development of high technology and national economy in China.”157 The NSCNN drafted the 
“Guojia Nami Keji Fazhan Gangyao” (National Nanotechnology Development Strategy) (2001-
2010), the first of its kind in China resembling similar initiatives as the NNI in the United States.158  
The National Nanotechnology Development Strategy was a blueprint for Chinese nanotechnology 
development for the 2001-2010 decade. It emphasized the importance of increasing government 
funding support for nanotechnology development, and prioritized commercialization of 
nanotechnology, training competent R&D personnel, appropriating intellectual property from R&D, 
and building up a national nanotechnology innovation system in the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-
2005). It called for technological breakthroughs in “nanomaterials production and fabrication, 
construction and integration of nanoscale devices, nanofabrication technologies, nano-scale 
structural analysis and performance testing techniques, and indigenous innovation in nanomaterials 
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production devices.”159 In military technologies, it called for “the development of nanotechnology 
and other high energy fuel Pyrotechnics Technology, breakthrough in nanostructured materials and 
special purpose coatings technology, development of integrated applications of nanotechnology 
sensors, control and motion systems and integrated micro-electromechanical systems technology for 
the micro / nano-type aircraft, micro / nano-satellite systems and special purpose integrated 
technology platform.”160 The 10th Five-Year Plan also set goals for the short-term (development of 
nanomaterials), medium-term (development of bio-nanotechnology and nanomedical technology) 
and long-term (development of nano-electronics and nanochips).  
More recent government policies have focused on leapfrogging the technology gap in key areas of 
research and building a system of innovation. MOST established the Nanotechnology 
Industrialization Base of China (NIBC) in Tianjin (a municipality not far from Beijing) in 2000, with 
support from the CAS to serve as the principal incubator for nanotechnology research spin-off 
companies. In 2005, MOST, CAS and the local Tianjin Municipality Government jointly established 
the China National Academy of Nanotechnology & Engineering (CNANE) within the same facility 
of NIBC, focusing on R&D development and fostering synergies between R&D and 
commercialization.  
In the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) the central government placed further strong emphasis on 
innovation, including “industrializing the technology for 90-nanometer and smaller integrated 
circuits” and developing “new materials badly needed in information, biological and aerospace 
industries.”161  
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Current  state  of  China’s  nanotechnology  development  
China has emerged as the one of the global leaders in development of nanotechnology. China has 
ranked only second to the U.S. in nanotechnology investment.162  China has ranked second in the 
number of peer-reviewed research publications relating to nanotechnology until 2013 (only behind 
the United States which produces about 70% more publications than China (see Figure 4, p. 38) and 
the second in the number of patents related to nanotechnology since 1998 (see Figures 2 and 3, p. 
36).163 China has also become a leader in the production of some nano-related industrial products, 
for instance, as Roselyn Hsueh notes above, the nano filters for air conditioners, nano-material 
textiles and clothing that have enhanced antimicrobial properties, the nano coatings and plastics for 
refrigerators, and anti-corrosive nano paints used in oil tanks.164 Although China still lags behind the 
United States and leading European countries in measures of research quality (i.e., ratio of high-
impact journal publications) and in terms of commercialization of research (i.e., share of 
nanotechnology patents held by industry), 165  it is determined to catch up and leapfrog the 
development cycle. 
China has also actively engaged in integrating its nanotechnology research and development with the 
global market and R&D platform, through developing international and national standards on 
nanotechnology. The National Center for Nanoscience and Technology led a project on researching 
nanotechnology standards for the 11th Five-Year Plan, which set the goal of creating international 
and national technology standards to ensure China’s place in the “intense competition between 
global measurement and research organizations,” because of the important role that standards play 
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in high-tech industry development. By 2011 (the end of the 11th Five-Year Plan), China has 
developed six international nanotechnology standards, and has implemented 22 national standards.166 
Nanotechnology  industry  stakeholders  in  China  
Government  
The longitudinal analysis of China’s nanotechnology development above has already highlighted the 
role of central government intervention in nanotechnology development in China. It should be 
noted that apart from the various initiatives and programs from the political actors at the central 
government (MOST, NSFC, CAS, CAE, etc.), local governments also play a crucial role in the 
creation of a national innovation system integrating research in the upstream and manufacturing in 
the downstream. Local governments provide support for local nanotechnology development 
programs. Most notable among these are the Dengshan (Climbing Up) Action Plan enacted by the 
Shanghai Municipality Government and dedicating funds to nanotechnology research, and the 
Shanghai Nanotechnology Promotion Center (SNPC), which provides funding and coordinates 
research in nanotechnology across seven local universities and nine private firms.  Local 
governments are able to provide infrastructure support, business development support, and 
preferential packages in taxation and financing to high-tech entrepreneurs and foreign enterprises.  
Universities  and  state-­‐‑sponsored  research  institutes  
There are hundreds of universities and state-sponsored research institutes actively engaged in 
nanotechnology research in China, with the most prominent universities and institutes concentrated 
in Beijing and Shanghai. In 2003, Tsinghua University, Peking University, and the CAS jointly 
established the National Center for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology (NCNST) in Beijing, with 
additional support from MOST, NDRC and the Ministry of Education (MOE). Bai Chunli serves as 
the director of NCNST. NCNST is involved in research in four areas: nanoprocessing and 
nanodevices, nanomaterials and nanostructures, nanomedicine and nanobiotechnology, 
nanostructure characterization and testing.167 
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Also in 2003, the Shanghai National Engineering Research Center for Nanotechnology (NERCN) 
was established by the National Development and Research Commission (NDRC) in Shanghai, 
whose major shareholders included the local CAS institutes, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Fudan 
University, East China Normal University, several local firms and SNPC. It focuses on 
nanotechnology R&D in areas including environmental protection, renewable energy, information 
technology, biomedical engineering and new materials.168 
Companies  
The number of Chinese nanotechnology firms is estimated at around 800-1000; however, 
information about them is scarce.169 There is not a national industry association for nanotechnology, 
and government bureaus do not track the number of firms. Most of the nanotechnology companies 
are concentrated in Beijing, Tianjin (which hosts the NIBC), Shanghai (which hosts SNPC), Suzhou 
(a city in Zhejiang Province which has the SIP BioBay, China’s first international innovation park 
focusing on nanotechnology and biotechnology within the Suzhou Industrial Park) and Guangdong 
Province. Over 80% of the nanotechnology firms collaborate with universities or research institutes 
either in China or abroad.170 Nanotechnology firms are permitted to apply for certification as a 
“high-tech firm” in order to apply for grants from national high-tech programs. For a company to 
be certified as such, it must meet certain requirements set forth by the relevant government bureau, 
such as intellectual property ownership, minimum percentage of employees with higher education 
degrees, and minimum percentage of revenues devoted to R&D.  
The commercialization of nanotechnology in China has been slow compared to advanced countries 
such as the United States. The Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and 
Technology (2006-2020) (MLP) listed nanotechnology under the basic science program section 
rather than the engineering section. According to Appelbaum et al., most nano-products produced 
by Chinese firms are low-level technology, and the eventual inclusion of nanotechnology in the MLP 
represents the central leadership’s trust of nanoscientists like Bai Chunli, who emphasize 
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nanotechnology’s extraordinary potential for trillions of dollars in commercialization revenue in the 
future (if indeed they materialize at all).171  
Technical  alliances  
An emerging type of stakeholder in China’s nanotechnology development is the technical alliance 
that aims to solve critical technological problems by leveraging the capabilities and resources of both 
industry and research institutions within a certain area. For instance, in 2010 the CAS Institute of 
Solid State Physics established in Anhui Province the Anhui Nanomaterials and Application 
Technology Innovation Strategic Alliance, which involves more than 20 research institutes and 
universities and firms in the province. These kinds of loose alliances are nascent and their impact is 
hard to predict at this point.  
Media  and  the  public  
The science reporters in China are generally positive towards the development of nanotechnology. 
According to a study conducted by the CAS on reporting on nanotechnology from two leading 
newspaper agencies, Science Times and Science and Technology Daily, from 2000 to June 2009, the number 
of reports on the negative aspects of nanotechnology accounted for only 11% of the total reports.172 
The media reports on the negative influence of nanotechnology center on basic research results, 
rather than the wider social and ethical issues that may arise due to nanotechnology development. 
Although the general public in China is largely excluded from science policy decision-making 
processes, the public perception of nanotechnology has been predominantly positive and correlated 
with the public veneration for state-sponsored high-tech industries to which the central leadership 
has credited the “rise of China.” The word “nano” has become a fashion in advertising new 
products to the public. A quick search on advertisements in Chinese online stores yields such 
popular products as “nano energy cups,” “nano advertising umbrellas,” and “nano magnetic pants,” 
which target public admiration of “nanotechnology” and the lack of strict regulation on advertising 
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that exaggerates product functions. The head of the NSCNN observed that “nanotechnology is 
highly technical, requires specialist knowledge, and the public doesn’t have the technical capacities or 
knowledge to understand the technologies or assess potential risks.”173 NCNST has hosted two 
science education programs for the general public, including science lectures, exhibitions, and visits 
to the labs. However, these preliminary activities in education and outreach on the science of 
nanotechnology are far from enough to make the general public sufficiently informed.  
Ethical,  legal,  and  safety  concerns  on  nanotechnology  development  in  China  
As of 2011, there were more than 30 research organizations in China conducting research on the 
toxicological and environmental effects of nanomaterials and nanoparticles, and the techniques to 
recover nanoparticles from manufacturing.174  The most notable one is the Joint Lab for Biological 
Effect for Nanomaterials and Nanosafety established by the Institute of High Energy Physics of the 
CAS and the NCNST in 2006. Bai Chunli, the chief architect of China’s nanotechnology 
development said at the lab establishment ceremony that “we cannot follow the old path of 
treatment after pollution…now as we start developing nanotechnology we should also study 
nanosafety, so that nanotechnology can become the first mature high technology safe and beneficial 
to human beings with negative influences already seriously studied and carefully considered 
beforehand.”175  
In 2009, researchers at the Department of Occupational Medicine at Beijing Chaoyang Hospital 
published one of the first studies in the world linking nanoparticles to toxic damage of organs of 
human workers exposed to them.176 Previous animal studies and in vitro experiments showed that 
nanoparticles can result in lung damage and other toxicity, but until this study there had not been 
reports on clinical toxicity in humans due to nanoparticles. 
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Apart from safety concerns with nanotechnology, there have also been rising concerns among 
Chinese academics on the social consequences of nanotechnology development, for instance the 
potential misuse of nanotechnology by terrorists, the lack of equity in access to nanomedicine 
between the rich and the poor, and the potential long-term damage of nanomaterials to the 
ecological environment.  China Social Science Today, the flagship journal of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, published a special issue in 2010 entitled “Interdisciplinary View of Nano-ethics” 
(Issue 125), which contained viewpoints from leading nanotechnology research scientists and social 
scientists. The experts suggest that research on ethical, legal and social issues of nanotechnology 
development should be strengthened, and given the highly interdisciplinary nature of 
nanotechnology, there needs to be further dialogue between the science community and the social 
science community, greater public awareness of ethical issues related to nanotechnology, and 
established channels for the general public to participate in ethical and policy-related discussions. 
As the preceding demonstrates, developing, emerging, and advanced countries are busily promoting 
nanotechnology via national industrial strategies, despite uncertainty over its military and economic 
potential, societal, environmental and health consequences, and commercial appeal. China hopes 
that nanotechnology will allow it to leapfrog to the top of the international technological hierarchy. 
The next section considers whether nanotechnology is likely to up end the existing hierarchy of 
technologically advanced countries and the structure of global power relationships.  
V.  TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND LEADERSHIP IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 
Science and technology play a dual role in establishing global power hierarchies; they are widely seen 
as the keys to economic growth and military dominance—the material base for national wealth, 
power and increased international status.177 Technological revolutions have altered the balance of 
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economic, military, and political power throughout the course of history, and policymakers are 
consequently keenly interested in maintaining national advantages in S/T innovation and seizing the 
lead in any emerging technological revolution.178 They also worry about the possibility that a 
revolutionary new technology will take them by surprise. What is the probability that countries can 
capitalize on their investments in nanotechnologies to change their geopolitical position in surprising 
ways? What are the implications for U.S. technological and military leadership? 
NATIONAL  INNOVATIVE  CAPACITY  MATTERS  
A broad group of scholars argue that, despite globalization, national characteristics define the nature 
of technological innovation and are critical to establishing and holding a technological edge. A 
number of such approaches in business administration, organizational sociology, economics, and 
political science give a central role to technology in attaining economic growth and military 
prowess.179   
In economics, new approaches developed in the 1980s challenged core neoclassical microeconomic 
tenets underpinning the market-driven, laissez faire view.180 These theories argue that technology, 
rather than capital and foreign direct investment, is the primary determinant of economic growth.181  
In contrast to neoclassical economic theories, technology is not a freely available public good in this 
view. Technology and knowledge are independent factors of production that shape a country’s 
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comparative advantage.182 Indeed, technology tends to be under-provided due to market failure: An 
individual firm’s investment in R&D spills over and becomes a public good for other firms in the 
economy, so the social rate of return on investment is more than double the investing firm’s private 
rate of return. Firms therefore tend to underinvest in research and development, as they are unable 
to collect the full benefits of their investment.183   
These approaches highlight, for differing reasons, that government support for technological 
innovation is necessary for economic growth and national security, and that government policy can 
fundamentally shape a country’s international technological position.  Neo-mercantilist and realist 
theories in their simplest form suggest that nations should seek to invent and manufacture advanced 
military technologies on their own and build a scientific workforce capable of producing them. 
Indigenous technological development is to be supported through trade barriers and national 
industrial policies providing subsidies and other incentives for technological research and 
development (R&D). Failing this ideal of technological autarchy, states should beg, borrow, and steal 
scientists and technologies from more advanced countries in order to catch up and overtake them. 
In this view, technologies are to be safeguarded and kept from enemies and potential adversaries 
through various forms of control, from secrecy to banning or limiting exports to intellectual 
property rights. Technological innovation and diffusion produces competition among states 
jockeying for survival, economic, military, and political dominance, and prestige.184  
Other approaches to technological innovation understand that technological change is endogenous 
to the socio-economic and political system that produces it. While traveling under different labels in 
different academic disciplines, these approaches all pay attention to the social embeddedness of S/T 
innovation—the social and political structures and norms that foster technological change and, 
critically, its societal and commercial uptake.185 Technological change and dominance therefore is 
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not simply caused by the invention or possession of a technology, but brought about through 
human choices and changes in social and political institutions that foster technologies and enable 
their use and diffusion.186 For example, Lynn White’s Medieval Technology and Social Change (White 
1964) highlights that gunpowder and cannon-making as technologies were widely diffused among 
Chinese, Europeans, Byzantines and Muslims, but it was only European conditions that led its 
leaders to apply these technologies to warfare in a systematic and successful fashion and establish 
Europe’s global dominance.187 A whole literature on national innovation systems (NIS) and varieties 
of capitalism highlights the various national forms of economic, political and social organization that 
can foster economic advancement, despite the globalization of market forces and actors.188 Some 
have focused on the development of subnational technology clusters, such as Silicon Valley and 
Route 128 in Boston, that have generated regional high tech economies.189 Existing social, political, 
educational, financial, and economic institutions and networks enable leaders to lock in their 
advantage, and ensure an ongoing technological edge over followers, creating a persistent core-
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periphery structure in the international economy.190 In this view, technology fosters international 
hierarchies that designate core, periphery and semi-periphery states and that are path-dependent and 
likely to be self-reinforcing.191 
Governments, as a result, have a fundamental role in providing public investment in science and 
R&D in order to ensure that it occurs. Furthermore, governments can create a competitive national 
advantage through such public stimulation of R&D.192  In this view, intangible investment in 
knowledge accumulation (through support for public education, basic R&D, and science, 
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education) is the primary determinant of 
economic growth.193  
Among those analyzing the state’s role in fostering technological advancement, the question of 
whether S/T change can lead technological laggards to surpass leaders is a matter of debate.194 
Simple technological borrowing or transfer is insufficient to allow technological laggards to catch up 
with, let alone surpass technological leaders. 195  Even skeptics, however, suggest that if 
technologically lagging countries are able to capture truly revolutionary technologies, they can leap 
ahead of dominant countries and change the international pecking order.196  This raises the stakes 
for states when a new, potentially revolutionary technology, such as nanotechnology, emerges.  
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Whether nanotechnology threatens U.S. technological dominance, this literature suggests, requires 
considering the broader national and global context of innovation that countries face. If we consider 
the investments that the United States and others are making in nanotechnology, these national and 
global dimensions are likely to be decisive in both capturing and controlling the lion’s share of 
benefits from technological innovation and controlling other countries’ access to them. 
U.S.  NATIONAL  COMPETITIVENESS  IN  NANOTECHNOLOGY  
The U.S. NNI has been assessed several times within its history, and one of the more recent 
assessments maintains that the US may be losing its competitive edge to innovative and R&D 
activity in Asian countries, particularly China.197 This section evaluates U.S. relative competitiveness, 
with an eye to assessing whether this pessimism is warranted, given the literature on national 
innovation and concerns about the accuracy of the data on nanotech. 
Through 2009, global government expenditures in nanotechnology were estimated to have reach $50 
billion, when USG investment fell behind that of the leaders (EU and Russia), and held par with that 
of China (see Figure 5, p. 66). U.S. companies continue to lead in private nanotech R&D—with 
roughly $2 billion invested—closely followed by the Japanese private sector (see Figure 6, p. 66). 
The National Research Council198 noted that the Battelle/R&D Magazine’s 2012 Global R&D 
Funding Forecast predicted that the U.S. share of total global R&D would decrease from 32.8% in 
2010 to 31.1% in 2012, and that the nations of Asia were expected to grow in funding, potentially 
posing long-term challenges to U.S. competitiveness.199 Based on measures of “nanotech activity” 
and “technology development strength,” Lux Research suggested in 2010 that the great powers of 
small-scale are Japan, Germany, Korea and Taiwan, while Singapore, Sweden, Korea, Israel and 
Switzerland dominate in particular nanotech niche markets. The United States, in their report, was 
slipping into “ivory tower status” as it fell behind on overall technology development capacity. 
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Russia is ranked along with Brazil and India as being in the “minor leagues.”200 Cientifica, on the 
other hand, in 2011 ranked the United States, followed by China, Russia, Germany and Japan as the 
countries where nanotech spending is most effectively transferred into economic activity.201 Such 
conflicting reports stem from the problematic data collection and measurement discussed earlier.  
Figure 5 and Figure 6 illustrate the 2008-2010 national investments of the ten countries that spend 
the most publicly and privately on nanotechnology, based on Lux Research data. Governmental 
officials pay close attention to these numbers. While the figures demonstrate that the United States 
leads in both government and private expenditures on nanotechnology, Russia and China are 
increasing public investment, while U.S. government spending is declining relative to 2009. The U.S. 
Congressional Research Service, also relying on Lux Research estimates, reported in its latest update 
on nanotechnology that U.S. Government investment is falling behind that of China and Russia on a 
purchasing power parity basis, but is still leading in real dollar terms. U.S. companies continue to 
lead in private nanotech R&D—with roughly $2 billion invested—closely followed by the Japanese 
private sector.202  
The U.S. President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology reported in 2012 that, “there 
has been concern that in addition to China, South Korea, and other early movers, the Russian 
Nanotech Corporation (RUSNANO) is now also rising as a major player, second only to the United 
States in its nanotechnology R&D spending. According to Lux Research, RUSNANO increased its 
funding by nearly 40 percent to $1.05 billion and has plans to increase even further to nearly $1.5 
billion by 2015.”203 The U.S. government is closely tracking RUSNANO’s activities, particularly its 
funding and acquisition of U.S. nanotech startups, even while admitting that RUSNANO’s projects 
“don’t make sense” both in terms of investments and return on investment. Russia’s investment is  
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Figure 5. National investments in nanotechnology for top ten countries 
 
Source: Reproduced from PCAST 2012 Report, p. 14. 
 
Figure 6. Corporate spending on nanotechnology for top ten countries 
 
Source: Reproduced from PCAST 2012 Report, p. 14. 
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not being matched by a commensurate increase in Russian nanotechnology publications or patents, 
both indicators of innovation and intellectual property rights.204 Similar attention is being paid to 
Chinese nanotech efforts.205 
Generally, the United States can still be characterized as the leader in the nanotech field. The U.S. 
President’s proposed 2014 Federal Budget provides more than $1.7 billion for the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), reflecting stable maintenance of the U.S. government investment 
in nanotech since its establishment in 2000. The three largest recipients of NNI are the Department 
of Defense, National Science Foundation, and the Department of Energy.206 The cumulative U.S. 
NNI investment since fiscal year 2001, including the 2014 request, now totals almost $20 billion. 
U.S. leadership in nanotech is reflected not only in quantity of funding and intellectual property 
being developed in nanotechnology, but also in quality. Priority patents (Figure 3, p. 36) are where 
the intellectual property holder is internationally recognized as the first to file and gains the exclusive 
right to claim, albeit for a limited time, that intellectual property. “Priority patent applications 
indicate which countries will successfully hold the intellectual property pertaining to a technology 
patent family.”207  Another indicator of quality is number of citations a publication receives. Figure 7 
below shows the number of citations of nanotechnology articles by lead author’s country. The figure 
shows that, while China surpassed the United States in applying for patents (Figure 2, p. 36) and 
publications (Figure 4, p. 38), the most widely cited publications are those authored in U.S. and 
Europe. The number of citations and publications on nanotechnology in three of the most 
prestigious scientific journals, Nature, Science, and the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
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suggest that Americans and Europeans are publishing the highest quality articles on nanotechnology. 
“The U.S. and EU-27 exhibit a large publication lead in these journals compared to their Asian 
counterparts and hold a dominate [sic] position in terms of global publishing rate.”208 What these 
data mean for nanotechnology’s potential to disrupt the global hierarchy of economic and military 
power is discussed below. 
Figure 7. Percentage by country of global citations for nanotechnology articles 
 
Source: Reproduced from President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) 2012 Report, p. 
35. 
 
A wide array of data on competitiveness and innovation-readiness provides the national context in 
which government bets on nanotechnology play out. New technologies are only likely to truly 
revolutionize an economy and society if there is a broader national base that allows that technology 
to spread and transform from its initial niche application. Several factors shape such an outcome, 
including the quality of the country’s higher educational system, business sector sophistication, 
property rights system, infrastructure, in addition to intellectual property outputs, such as patents 
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and scientific articles. Figure 8, below, shows the overall R&D intensity of the OECD countries, as 
well as Brazil, Russia, India and China in 2011.  
Figure 8. R&D in OECD and key partner countries, 2011 
 
Source: OECD Science, Technology, and Industry Scorecard 2013, p. 50. 
 
Regionally, location matters in terms of generating innovation economies. The OECD has 
documented that only a few countries, particularly the United States and Japan, are home to many of 
the top knowledge intensive industries (information and communications technology, 
biotechnology, and nanotechnology). Figure 9 shows the location of regions that are leaders in the 
production of patents in biotechnology, ICT, and nanotechnology over time. What this figure 
suggests is that if we assume that early patents are more likely to reflect core intellectual property in 
these sectors and later patents reflect derivative intellectual property, then the United States and its 
allies remain technological leaders. Countries with significant innovation “hot spots” in these 
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technologies include the United States, Germany, Japan, Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Korea, 
China appears on this map after 2008, while Russia, India and Brazil do not register at all.209 Russia, 
China, and India, in an effort to catch up, have all adopted the Western business model of 
“technology clusters”, with highly visible outlays for new nanotechnology research parks in 
Skolkovo, Suzhou, and Bangalore, respectively.210 
Figure 9. Innovation Hotspots in ICT, Biotechnologies, and Nanotechnologies, 1998-2000 and 
2008-2010 
 
Source: OECD STIS 2013, p. 55. 
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A number of organizations have developed indices of relative economic and technological 
advancement and innovativeness. These include the World Bank’s Knowledge Economy Index 
(KEI) and Knowledge Index (KI). The KI measures a country’s capacity to “generate, adopt and 
diffuse knowledge,” while the KEI measures whether the country’s environment is “conducive for 
knowledge to be used effectively.” 211 The Knowledge Index lists the United States 9th, Germany 
10th, the U.K. 16th, Japan 18th, Russia 43rd, Brazil 55th, China 86th, and India 115th in terms of ability to 
generate, adopt and diffuse knowledge. In terms of a knowledge-ready environment, the KEI ranked 
Germany 8th, the United States 12th, the United Kingdom 14th, Japan 22nd, Russia 55th, Brazil 60th, 
China 84th 109th. Two other indices, the Global Innovation Index (GII) and the Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI) also shed light on national capabilities to create and adopt new 
knowledge and technologies.212 In 2013, the Global Innovation Index Report ranked the United 
States, United Kingdom, Germany and Japan as the top four innovators (in that order) in terms of 
quality, which in turn is based on quality of universities, patents and citations. China ranked in 19th 
place, with Brazil edging out Russia for 25th place, and India in 31st.213 China and India are 
categorized as efficient learners in innovation, with Brazil lagging them slightly. Russia, on the other 
hand, underperforms in innovation relative to its GDP. The United States, United Kingdom, Japan, 
and Germany are all in characterized as innovation leaders relative to GDP.214 The GCI has a similar 
ranking for overall competitiveness and innovation-readiness.Error! Reference source not found. 
Germany, Japan, the U.S., and U.K. all rank in the top ten on innovation and sophistication factors; 
Russia, ranked 99th, is far outpaced by China (34th), India (41st), and Brazil (44th).215 
Nationally, it appears that Russia, in particular, Brazil, and India are the least prepared to profit from 
the invention of a revolutionary nanotechnology that would enable them to leap ahead of more 
advanced economies.216 Russian officials admit that they are three to four decades behind the West 
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in terms of technology development, and that their country lacks favorable conditions for 
innovation.217 China is now the second largest R&D performer, behind the United States, which 
performs twice the amount of R&D as that done in China. Of the top fifty universities in the world, 
thirty-four are in the United States, with two for the first time appearing outside of the OECD, in 
Taiwan. The remainder lies in Western Europe.218 
These data suggest that the national context for innovation greatly matters for the impact 
nanotechnologies are likely to have on national economic competitiveness and national security. 
Expectations that nanotechnology investment will allow those with a weak innovation environment 
to catch up to and surpass technological leaders in the OECD seem overblown. A broader 
innovation base gives these countries a lead that is difficult to surpass. 
Globally, the internationalization of R&D and production appear to further undermine assumptions 
a country’s ability to leap-frog via indigenous development and/or commercialization of a new 
technology, even a revolutionary one, to the top of the technological hierarchy. International 
scientific and research collaboration is becoming a hallmark of a country’s categorization as 
knowledge economy.  The OECD has calculated that among large firms, collaboration in innovation 
reaches as high as seventy percent in the some of the most technologically advanced countries, while 
collaboration among small and medium enterprises only ranges from 20-40%. Market sources of 
collaboration (i.e., suppliers, customers, and competitors) far outstrip institutional sources (higher 
education and government).219 This means that countries with underdeveloped or relatively weak 
business sophistication, such as Russia,220 are likely at a pronounced disadvantage in accessing and 
diffusing innovative technologies domestically.  
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International collaboration is also a significant source of economic competitiveness that can allow a 
country’s firms to access to a wider range of knowledge and resources at lower cost and risk.221 
Brazil, Russia, and Japan rely heavily on national partners, whereas other countries display more 
balance between national and international.222  International mobility in researchers also suggests the 
difficulty of national attempts to create and hold onto a technological edge. Scientific brain drain 
tends to augment the strength of technological leaders, particularly the United States. In terms of net 
bilateral flows, the OECD calculates that Russia lost 61%, India 32%, and Japan 17% of its scientific 
authors to the United States during the 1996-2011 period. Japan has seen a net loss of 47% of 
scientific authors to China. In contrast, China and Korea have reversed brain drain, gaining 3% and 
24% respectively more scientific authors than the United States during the same period.223  
The exception here is the United States, as it attracts the highest number of scientists and 
researchers from abroad, reducing the need for external collaboration. The United States has the 
least amount of international collaboration, but the highest quality with respect to top-cited 
publications from 2003-2011.224 Similarly, the U.S.-based authors “account for more than a third of 
all scientific documents cited in patents in the areas of biotechnology, health, nanotechnology, ICT 
[information and communications technology] and environment,” revealing its broad and fairly 
balanced basis for knowledge transfer to the economic innovation system. China, Japan, and Korea 
have a degree of specialization in nanotechnologies, relative to the United States, which has 
somewhat more specialization in ICT than the other fields.225 Finally, many of the metrics and 
technology forecasts on nanotechnology take a decidedly state-centric starting point. Far fewer 
studies emphasize the role that global R&D alliances and networks play in nanotech development.226 
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Yet what research is done displays significant transnational collaboration on nanotech R&D, with 
the United States as the central hub in the network.227 There is extensive collaboration between U.S. 
and Chinese scientists on nanotechnology, as well as among other countries.228 
The United States is unlikely soon to be displaced by China or emerging economies in the 
nanotechnology sector. The United States was an early pioneer in nanotech development, as 
indicated by the 1996 Nobel Prize awarded to Richard Smalley for the discovery of fullerenes. The 
United States also remains ahead in terms of commercialization, although concerns among U.S. 
officials that Asian countries are rapidly catching up should not be dismissed.229  
VI.  CONCLUSION: NANOTECHNOLOGY AS (TENTATIVELY) REVOLUTIONARY  
Is nanotechnology revolutionary? As this report shows, nations are busily placing bets that 
nanotechnology will radically alter their position in the international system; whether these bets are 
well placed depends on whether or not nanotech is truly revolutionary.230 The problem with 
forecasting technological revolutions is that they are only predictable in hindsight, so our 
conclusions must be considered tentative.231  
There are different views on what constitutes technological revolution and disruption. Where 
political scientists and historians speak of technological revolutions, the business and economics 
literatures refer to disruptive and general-purpose technologies.  Political scientists and historians are 
concerned with a broader phenomenon—socio-political and economic reorganization that is part 
cause and consequence of technological innovation, a concept more in keeping with the 
introduction of a new “general purpose technology,” rather than a disruptive or sustaining one.232 In 
business and economics, a general-purpose technology has “substantial and pervasive effect across 
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the whole of society.”233 “Disruptive technologies”, in contrast, “provide dramatic improvements to 
current product market paradigms, or produce the physical and service products that initiate new 
industries. These regime changes define a new product platform, which is far different from what 
the market would have experienced with ‘only’ incremental innovation.” 234 Incremental innovation, 
on the other hand, incorporates new “sustaining technologies … that improve the performance of 
established products through the current technology product paradigm.” 235 A disruptive technology 
only gradually gains adherents, until such a time as some tipping point is reached, and the 
technology displaces others.236 A 2008 U.S. National Intelligence Council report, in contrast, defined 
disruptive technologies as simply those having the potential to degrade or enhance one or more of 
the following elements of national power: geopolitical, military, economic, and social cohesion.237  
At present, despite the definitional and data problems discussed earlier, we tentatively conclude that 
nanotechnology will be revolutionary, if it is widely adopted. Our tentativeness stems from ongoing 
debate over whether nanotech will revolutionize economy and society. A current, sober, academic 
assessment is that nanotech does appear to have the characteristics of a general-purpose technology, 
and therefore may be considered revolutionary in social and political spheres beyond its economic 
applications.238 U.S. officials focused on nanotechnologies, however, do not agree on whether 
nanotechnologies are revolutionary. Some view them as largely incremental, while others highlight 
that only particular commercial sectors—medicine and energy (especially solar)—would see 
disruption. Electronics and materials science nanotechnologies are viewed as more evolutionary than 
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revolutionary.239 Another assessment suggests that Asian countries that are betting heavily on 
nanomaterials and nanoelectronics are on an evolutionary path, as nanomanufacturing and bio-
nanotechnology are the disruptive sectors.240 Not surprisingly, U.S. investments in nanotechnology 
reflect a heavy investment in a core U.S. strength: the life sciences. China and Russia, in contrast, are 
strong in materials science, where it is unclear that new disruptive materials will emerge, although it 
is possible as yet-undiscovered nanomaterials may be revolutionary.  
Nanotech is not a case of technological surprise for the United States. Dual-use technologies, 
including nanotechnology, however, rarely lead to strategic or tactical surprise.241 U.S., European and 
Japanese research and development in nanotech has been ongoing for forty years, with substantial 
investments by the U.S. military and government prior to the 2000 establishment of the U.S. NNI. 
These investments have made the United States the leader in nanotechnology, so if there is a basis 
for surprise, it is for countries such as Russia that effectively dropped out of technological 
competition for the twenty years following the end of the Cold War, or China and India, which only 
began to seriously embrace nanotechnology at the outset of the twenty-first century. While China’s 
overall R&D growth is notable and impressive,242 in nanotechnology, it still lags in quality. The 
central issue with respect to surprise is how non-state actors may apply nano-enabled technologies 
for malfeasant ends, an issue beyond the scope of this study that requires further research. 
Applications of nanotech are already widespread in defense, electronics, energy, some consumer 
products, and are becoming so in medicine. There is limited potential for surprise in the form of 
mass destructive or disruptive effects from nanotechnology applications, with the caveat that new 
nanomaterials or novel nanobiological agents may be discovered. Nanotechnology compounds the 
existing difficulties in chemical and biological weapons proliferation, particularly with regard to 
synthetic creation of novel agents; but it makes up for this by offering significant gains in detection 
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and monitoring. Nanotech accelerates and integrates the already established trends towards 
miniaturization, automation, stealth, precision targeting, and energy efficiency. In life sciences, 
nanotechnology is creating a revolution in health care. Here, diagnosis and treatment are being 
increasingly tailored to the individual person, if not their individual cells. Life science applications to 
environmental remediation are aiming to eliminate hunger and potable water scarcity. In energy, the 
potential for cheap solar cells and improvements in energy storage point toward a post-carbon 
economy. This will dramatically affect defense applications in ways that differ from the ongoing 
trends to create smaller and smaller automated drones and personal digital devices capable of 
conducting all manner of military tasks. Much of nanotech’s revolutionary promise in these fields is 
to reduce or even eliminate conflict over key resources, such as energy, food and water. The 
implications for national and global security would then be profound. The main surprise today arises 
from how pervasive nanotechnology already is, a fact of which the public is generally unaware.243 
The sum total of the social, economic and political impact of these technologies will fundamentally 
change society and the economy, if they are widely adopted. 
Societal factors shape the up-take of new technologies and will affect nanotechnology’s 
revolutionary potential. The history of technological revolution and technology adoption suggests 
that mere investment and invention is insufficient to launch a technological revolution.244 Consumer 
and, more broadly, societal acceptance are necessary for technology to have a significant impact.245 
Nanotechnologies will only be revolutionary if they are taken up and widely commercialized.246 This 
outcome is not certain, for two reasons. Nanotechnology has not been commercialized as quickly as 
forecast, as venture capitalists and private funders are concerned about the long time horizon 
between basic and applied R&D and scaling up to product development. 247  Firms and insurance 
companies are worried about societal acceptance, as nanotech has generated considerable concern 
                                                
243 NSF, Science and Engineering Indicators 2012 (2012), pp. 7-43.  
244 Keith Krause, Arms and the State (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Robert 
Gilpin, War and change in world politics (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 
245 J. Youtie, M. Iacopetta, and S. Graham, "Assessing the Nature of Nanotechnology: Can We 
Uncover an Emerging General Purpose Technology?"  The Journal of Technology Transfer 33 (3):315–
329 (2007) 
246 E. O’Rourke and M. Morrison, “Challenges for Governments in Evaluating Return on 
Investment from Nanotechnology and Its Broader Economic Impact,” OECD Background Paper, 
(2012) 
247 Ibid. 
 	  	   78 
about environmental, health, and safety impacts of nano-enabled products and nano-manufacturing 
processes.248 There is considerable disagreement among the European Union, United States, Brazil, 
and China over both the statistical definition of nanotechnology, and the definition of industrial 
standards.249 As toxicological studies are completed and nanotech’s health, safety, privacy and 
environmental impacts become known, there is potential for public backlash against them, as 
happened in the EU over genetically-modified organisms. Such a backlash may significantly alter the 
commercial viability of various nanotech-enabled sectors, and provide an advantage for countries 
where nanotechnologies are generally viewed positively, which today include the United States and 
China. 
KEY  FINDINGS  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS  
Nanotechnology is a general-purpose technology that is contributing to the ongoing revolution in 
information and communications technologies, microelectronics and robotics. The nature of warfare 
has already been dramatically transformed over the past thirty years with the increasing importance 
of precision-guided munitions, unmanned vehicles, and information dominance and surveillance. 
Nanotechnology dramatically extends and accelerates this trend. There is little evidence that 
nanotechnologies provide the basis for novel weapons of mass destruction or mass effect. 
Nanotechnology is converging with the chemical, biological and cognitive sciences in ways that 
promise to revolutionize human health and environment. Nanotechnology is likely to dramatically 
improve the health and resilience of armed forces personnel and the public and potentially even 
reduce resource scarcity as a cause of war. The United States remains a leader in nanotechnology, 
along with German and Japan, though other Asian countries, including China, are expanding and 
improving their nanotechnological base. In order to maintain this position, the USG should 
continue its investment in nanotechnology, with an ongoing sustained commitment to basic R&D 
and increased assistance in the commercialization of nanotech applications.  
To date, there is little appetite or emphasis on governing the dual-use and military applications of 
nanotechnology at the multilateral or national levels. Nanotechnology poses the same challenges as 
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biological technology with respect to its dual-use nature and governance challenges. With very few 
exceptions, no scholarly literature focuses on regulating military uses of nanotechnology.250 The 
focus of national regulation has been on public health, safety and environment preservation.251 
Currently, countries are relying on existing nonproliferation and export control regimes to cover 
nanotechnologies. These regimes are ill-equipped to keep pace with the rapid advances in what is 
now an inherently trans-disciplinary science. One result has been the increasing devolution of 
responsibility for national security to corporations and individual scientists.252 This push for self-
regulation arises in large part from the tremendous difficulties in merely monitoring scientific 
activities that unwittingly can lead to weaponization of nanotechnology-enabled materials, 
pathogens, or delivery platforms. In the absence of appetite for either multilateral or national 
regulations, U.S. agencies should work with academics and corporations to foster a culture of nano-
security and dual-use awareness and codes of conduct for research and development. As in 
biosecurity, some of the responsibilities for what managing the risk that peaceful materials will be 
used for nefarious purposes can be placed scientists themselves, through fostering awareness, 
dialogue, and cultural norms among scientists themselves. Such norms cannot substitute for 
governmental and intergovernmental cooperation to manage the dual-use risks from 
nanotechnology, and create international norms and governance mechanisms regarding their 
legitimate development and use. At present, however, without such governance regimes or 
established networks of information sharing and transnational cooperation among scientists, 
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corporations and intelligence and security practitioners,253 there is an ongoing need for the USG to 
continue to monitor closely nanotech developments domestically and abroad. 
The problem of remaining aware of nanotechnology advances is only worsened by the questionable 
comparability and quality of existing indicators on nanotechnology R&D. It is necessary to collect 
more data on nanotechnology’s military and commercial applications and health, safety, and 
environmental impacts, as well as for comparative analysis with analogous technologies that have 
had disruptive and/or revolutionary impacts. The U.S. government should encourage more 
interdisciplinary collaboration between scientists, policymakers, defense practitioners, and market 
actors to facilitate comparative longitudinal and cross-national data collection and measurement. It is 
important to gather not only the information available, but to ask the more difficult analytical 
questions about what the technologies mean, for whom, and how to assess the nature of the threats 
and opportunities from both a security and a competitiveness perspective. Another challenge is to 
integrate analyses from global supply chain analysis, to gain a better picture of how the globalization 
of defense and civilian nanotech production, as well as production networks of scientific research 
and manufacturing, may affect U.S. efforts to control illegitimate development and use of 
nanotechnology. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
BMBF Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Germany) 
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India and China 
BWC Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
CAE Chinese Academy of Engineering 
CAS Chinese Academy of Sciences 
CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive weapons 
CCC Naval Postgraduate School Center on Contemporary Conflict 
CCP Communist Party of China 
CNANE China National Academy of Nanotechnology and Engineering 
CNITA China Nonwovens & Industrial Textiles Association 
CNTAC China National Textiles & Apparel Council 
COCOM Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls 
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention 
DURC Dual Use Research of Concern 
EDA European Defense Agency 
EHS Environmental and Health Safety 
EU  European Union 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
ISO TC Technical Committee of the International Organization for Standardization 
JIP Joint Investment Programme 
MFA Multi-Fiber Arrangement 
MLP Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology 
MNC Multinational Corporation 
MOD Ministry of Defense (United Kingdom) 
MOE Ministry of Education 
MOST Ministry of Science and Technology  
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NCNST National Center for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology 
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission 
NERCN Shanghai National Engineering Research Center for Nanotechnology 
NIBC Nanotechnology Industrialization Base of China 
NIS National Innovation Systems 
NNI U.S. National Nanotechnology Initiative 
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
NSA Department of National Security Affairs 
NSCNN National Steering Committee of Nanoscience and Nanotechnology  
NSF National Science Foundation (United States) 
NSFC National Natural Science Foundation of China 
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OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PASCC Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD 
PRC People's Republic of China 
R&D Research and Development 
RUSNANO Russian Nanotech Corporation 
S/T Science and Technology 
SATI State Administration of Textile Industry 
SCENIHR Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks of the 
European Commission 
SIP Suzhou Industrial Park 
SNPC Shanghai Nanotechnology Promotion Center 
SSTC State Science and Technology Commission  
STEM Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics 
STM Scanning Tunneling Microscopy 
TNC Transnational Corporation 
UN United Nations 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
USG United States Government 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WTO World Trade Organization 
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